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INTRODUCTION

For some unexplained reason, the law of debtor and creditor, and more
specifically, the law relating to the enforcement of money judgments by
unsecured creditors, has not of late spawned an overwhelming array of
academic writing. A handful of articles and notes in learned journals and three
casebooks have served to help educate lawyers, judges, law professors and
students. Hardly a massive display of interest in an area of the law that has
been aptly characterized as "often ambiguous, complex and archaic" 1 - an
area much in need of organizational, substantive and procedural reform.
This rather appalling dearth of recent material on so vital a subject may
be contrasted with the texts on enforcement that seemed to abound in the nineteenth century. 2 However, a renewed interest in debtor-creditor law has been
apparent, at least to some degree, since the 1960's. For the most part, law
reform agencies have been in the vanguard, 3 clearly recognizing that the deficiencies, vagaries and confusion endemic in this branch of the law has continued far too long. In the nature of things, however, these valuable sources of
information cannot be -

and, indeed, do not purport to be -

comprehensive

texts bringing together in a coherent work the often incoherent mass of debtorcreditor law.

IOntario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Enforcement of Judgment
Debts and Related Matters (3 parts, Toronto: Min. of the A.G., 1981) Part 1, at 1
[hereinafter
OLRC Report, Part I, Part II and Part III].
2
See, e.g., Anderson, A Treatise on the Law of Execution in the High Court and
Inferior Courts (London: Butterworths, 1889); Edwards, The Law of Execution Upon
Judgments and Orders of the High Court (London: Stevens & Sons, 1888); Bingham,
The Law and Practice of Judgments and Executions (London: Butterworths, 1815);
Craven, A Handbookfor High Bailiffs (London: Shaw & Sons, 1887); and, Herman, A
Treatise on the Law ofExecutions (New York: Cockrost, 1876).
3See, e.g., Northern Ire., Report of the Joint Working Party on the Enforcement
of Judgments, Orders and Decrees of the Courts in Northern Ireland (Belfast:
H.M.S.O., 1965) (the "Northern Ireland Report"); Eng., Report of the Committee on
the Enforcement of Judgment Debts (PayneReport) (Cmnd. 3909, 1969); New South
Wales Law Reform Commission, Draft Proposal Relating to the Enforcement of
Money Judgments (Sydney: New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 1975) (the
"New South Wales Report"); New Brunswick Department of Justice, Law Reform
Division, 2 Third Report of the Consumer Protection Project, Legal Remedies of the
Unsecured Creditor After Judgment (Fredericton: Law Reform Division, Dept. of
Justice, 1976) (the "New Brunswick Report"); Law Reform Commission of British
Columbia, Report on Debtor-CreditorRelationships:Part I,Debt Collection and Collection Agents (Vancouver: The Commission, 1971), Part IV, Pre-JudgmentInterest
(Vancouver: The Commission, 1978); Report on Absconding DebtorsActand BailAct:
Two Obsolete Acts (Vancouver: The Commission, 1978); Report on Attachment of
Debts Act (Vancouver: The Commission, 1978); Report on Creditor'sRelief Legislation: A New Approach (Vancouver: The Commission, 1979); Alberta Institute of Law
Research and Reform, Assignment of Wages (Edmonton: Institute of Law Research
and Reform, 1971); Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Report on Enforcement of
Judgments, PartI, Exemptions under the GarnishmentAct (Winnipeg: Man. L.R.C.,
1979), PartIII, Exemptions under the Executions Act (Winnipeg: Man. L.R.C., 1979),
PartII, Exemptions underthe Judgments Act (Winnipeg: Man. L.R.C., 1980); Report
on the GeneralRegister (Winnipeg: Man. L.R.C., 1980); and, OLRC Report, Parts I,
II, and III.
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Mercifully, this void has now been filled by Professor Dunlop's CreditorDebtor Law in Canada, and for this alone we should all be most grateful.
However, Dunlop's courageous excursion into what hitherto has often been
uncharted seas deserves praise not merely because it provides the Canadian
(and, it is to be hoped, the international) legal community with a new text on
debtor-creditor law. It is, in fact, an admirable and prodigious effort at comprehension, assimilation, rationalization and exposition. The pains of many
years have resulted in a work that deserves to be read by practitioners, jurists,
academics and students. Indeed, it actually can be read - even for the sheer
pleasure of absorbing interesting and reliable information.
Having regard to the nature and scope of this volume, Professor Dunlop
has, in the process of introducing his book, short-changed himself. After
noting the paucity of scholarly writing on the law of enforcement of money
judgments, he states that "some good casebooks have been published. ' 4 Unfortunately, one is now generally of interest to antiquarians only, 5 another is
basically an amalgam of statutes and cases, with little commentary, 6 and the
third is, like the others, out of print (although it is the only one to be reprinted
in a new edition). 7 Moreover, even the best casebook cannot supplant a good
text, particularly one that so comprehensively and successfully discusses the
law governing the enforcement of money judgments in all Canadian common
law jurisdictions.
II.

FORMAT

Before attempting to outline and review the substance of Professor
Dunlop's book, a few words on format and organization are in order. Aside
from a useful (and, by now, not uncommon) "Table of Cases" - where over
2,000 cases are listed, itself an indicia of the comprehensiveness of the
coverage - the volume contains a detailed "Table of Statutes", "Rules and
Regulations" and a "List of Works Cited". It goes without saying, of course,
that both Tables facilitate the use to which the book may be put.
Regretably, the same cannot be said of the "Index": it clearly is not as
detailed as it ought to be - a problem that seems to arise frequently in Canadian (and, indeed, other) publications. Lengthy searches through an index
tend to bespeak excessive pruning, whether in the interest of cost-cutting or
otherwise.
The organization of the book is generally orthodox. However, one might
perhaps question why the chapter on "Execution" is so far removed from,

4

Dunlop, Creditor-Debtor Law in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1981) at 2
[hereinafter Dunlop].
5MacGuigan, Cases and Materialson Creditors'Rights (2d ed. Toronto: Univ. of
Toronto Press, 1967).
6Walker and Ash, Debtor-CreditorRelations: Casesand Materials(Toronto: Butterworths, 1978).
7Trebilcock, Reiter and Laskin, Debtorand Creditor: Cases, Notes, and Materials
(Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1979). See now, Laskin, et al., Debtorand Creditor:
Cases,Notes, andMaterials(2d ed. Toronto: Edmond-Montgomery, 1982).
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say, "Seizure and Sale", broken up as it is by the discussion of prejudgment
remedies, attachment of debts and other creditors' remedies. After all,
chapter 6, on "Execution", does focus attention on writs of fierifacias and,
therefore, is intimately connected with "Seizure and Sale". But this is mere
quibbling.
III. MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE
A. General
There is a certain difficulty in reviewing a large law book devoted to matters of detail. While one might be tempted to criticize the book on this very
basis, it should be pointed out that the law relating to the enforcement of judgment debts is itself complex and detailed; a mass of statutory and regulatory
material, case law from Canada, England and elsewhere, and holdovers from
the days of Robin Hood. One simply cannot escape the minutiae of enforcement law.
This is not to say that Professor Dunlop has ignored the socioeconomic
milieu in which debt collection is undertaken. 8 However, for better or for
worse, he has concentrated his efforts mainly on "the law", without losing
sight of its deficiencies and possible avenues for reform. The book is,
therefore, largely a creditor-orientedbook. But, then, the law respecting the
enforcement of judgment debts is necessarily a creditor-oriented device.
B.

Creditors'Rights vs. Debtors'Rights
Without attempting to be overly sensitive to language, it is perhaps not
without some interest that the book is entitled Creditor-Debtor Law in
Canada, thereby eschewing what seems to be the more common "debtorcreditor law" terminology. What's in a title? While the usage may be fortuitous and unintended, it may be noted that, in fact, very little time is expended
on the rights of debtors. For example, having regard to the length of the treatment of topics respecting the collection of judgment debts, only relatively
passing reference is made to instalment payment plans and stays of execution
in favour of judgment debtors. 9 While the opportunity for a debtor to benefit
from such "rights" is more firmly entrenched in Saskatchewan, 10 for example,
provision has been made for them in Ontario (although there does appear to be
some controversy concerning their scope).
8 See,
9
See,
0

e.g., Dunlop at 7 et seq.

e.g., Dunlop at 45, 60-66 and 106-107.
1 See The District Court Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. D-32, ss. 64-74, and The Queen's
Bench Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. Q-1, ss. 75-85. Under both statutes, the courts are given very
broad powers to order instalment payment plans and stays in respect of most judgments
for the recovery of money. In disposing of a request for an order, the court is empowered to act upon its own view of the proper order to be made, having regard to all
the facts. On making an instalment payment order, the court may decide which enforce-

ment proceedings, if any, may be taken, and when any proceedings may commence.

This would seem to give the court jurisdiction, for example, to permit execution against
all or part of the debtor's personal property, while at the same time to prohibit garnish-

ment of the debtor's wages. For a similar proposal for the Ontario small claims courts
(but, significantly, not the higher courts), see OLRC Report, Part I at 68.
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In the latter connection, reference may usefully be made to Dunlop's view
of the ambit of the stay of execution remedy in Ontario. Despite the absence of
specific Ontario legislation empowering the higher courts to stay execution in
all cases, 11 Dunlop asserts that "the courts retain their inherent jurisdiction to
direct a stay on a proper case." ' 12 Two of the cases he cites in support of this
proposition are Mitchell v. Fidelityand Casualty Company of New York 13 and
Cotton v. Corby. 14 In Mitchell, Meredith C.J.O. approved a statement in the
second edition of Halsbury's Laws of England to the effect that the English
High Court "has an inherent jurisdiction over all judgments or orders which it
has made, under which it can stay execution in all cases." 15 Meredith C.J.O.
stated that, in the courts of Ontario, this jurisdiction has been exercised, and
as far as he was aware its existence never had been questioned.
However, it bears noting that the early Ontario cases espousing the notion
that the Supreme Court has inherent jurisdiction to stay execution involved
stays pending appeal. Moreover, the above-quoted statement in the second
edition of Halsbury'sLaws of Englandhas been rejected by the English Court
of Appeal in T. C. Trustees Ltd. v. J.S. Darwen(Successors)Ltd. 16
" See, however, Wages Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 526, s. 8(1), dealing with instalment
payment plans and stays "[w]here a garnishment order has been made against the debtor"; and O.R.P. 505 et seq., dealing with stays pending appeal. With respect to the
scope of Rule 505, see OLRC Report, Part I at 56-58.
12Dunlop at 61.

13(1917), 38 O.L.R. 543, 34 D.L.R. 22 (App. Div.).
14(1859), 5 U.C.L.J. 67 (App. Div.).
5
1 Halsbury,

Laws (2d) para 61. Meredith, C.J.O., cited Cotton v. Corby, supra,
note 14, and Sharpe v. White (1910), 20 O.L.R. 575 (Div. Ct.), affd (1911), 25 O.L.R.
298 (C.A.). 16[19691 Q.B. 295, [1969] 2 W.L.R. 81 (C.A.). The statement in the second edition
was modified in the fourth edition to differentiate the court's general power to stay proceedings from the power to stay the execution of a final judgment or order:
The court's power to stay proceedings should not be confused with its
power to stay the execution of a final judgment or order. The court has an
inherent jurisdiction to control its own proceedings so as to prevent an
abuse of process, and accordingly to stay proceedings which are frivolous,
vexatious or harassing, or which are manifestly groundless or in which
there is clearly no cause of action in law or equity, or where the justice of
the case so requires. The court does not, however, have an inherent
jurisdiction over all judgments or orders which it has made under which it
can stay execution in all cases... The court has no inherent jurisdiction or
other power to stay or suspend the execution of ajudgment....
(Halsbury, Laws (4th) para. 451. For another reference to this issue, see OLRC Report,
Part 157 n. 183.)
The general statutory silence respecting the power of the Ontario higher courts should
be contrasted with the wide jurisdiction given the Ontario small claims courts, a
jurisdiction not discussed in any detail by Dunlop. For example, s.131(8) of the Small
Claims CourtsAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 476, provides for instalment payment plans in the
context of "judgment summons" proceedings, and s. 102(1) provides more generally
that "[t]he judge may order the times and the proportions in which a sum and costs
recovered by judgment shall be paid, having regard to section 117." While not a model
of clarity, s. 117 is a critically important provision operating both in conjunction with
s. 102(1) and independently, as a general relief provision. It provides as follows:
117. Except where a new trial is granted, the issue of execution shall not
be postponed for more than fifty days from the service of the summons,
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C.

The Setting
Prior to considering "the principal subject of this book, namely, the
remedies which the legal system offers the unsecured creditor which will enable
him to collect the money owed to him by his debtor,"' 17 Professor Dunlop
discusses such preliminary topics as the nature of a "debt" (chapter 2), the
meaning and effect of a "judgment" (chapter 3), and extra-judicial debt collection (chapter 4). The discussion provides the reader with background
knowledge of the setting in which judgment debts are enforced by unsecured
creditors. But Dunlop clearly acknowledges that, while legitimate debts must
be collected, it is not creditors alone whose interests deserve consideration and
protection: an enforcement system that routinely countenances the penury of
debtors cannot be morally sound or even beneficial to creditors generally. In
this connection, Dunlop states that "[o]ne of the defects of the present system
of creditors' remedies is that it encourages creditors to execute or garnishee
preciptiously in order to be sure of payment." 18
In the main, proposals for reform throughout the common law world do
not envisage any dramatic shift insofar as the respective roles of the state and
creditors are concerned. For example, the Ontairo Law Reform Commission
recommended as follows with respect to the jurisdiction of its proposed new
without the consent of the party entitled thereto, but, if it is proved to the
satisfaction of the judge that a party is unable from sickness or other cause
to pay the debt or damages recovered against him or any instalment
thereof ordered to be paid, or that for any other reason the issue of execution should be further postponed, the judge may stay the judgment, order
or execution for such time and on such terms as he thinks fit, and so from
time to time until it is proved that the cause of disability has ceased.
Concerning whether the phrase "or other cause" must be read ejusdem generis, see
OLRC Report, Part I at 54. For reform proposals expanding even further the jurisdiction of small claims court judges (but not higher court judges), see Part I at 62 et seq.
With respect to instalment payment plans and stays of execution in Small Claims
Courts, reference should also be made to the role of the Small Claims Court Referee:
see Part
I at 10-11 and 74-75.
17
Dunlop at 91.
18 Id. at 11. It should be borne in mind, of course, that, because of such statutes as
the Creditors' ReliefAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 103, only one creditor need seize personalty
or garnish debts: generally speaking, all other execution creditors have the right to share
in the proceeds. See id. ss. 3-5. Moreover, a writ offierifacias filed in a sheriff's office
automatically binds all Registry Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 445, land of the debtor within the
sheriffs bailiwick: see Execution Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 146, s. 10(1). (With respect to
Land Titles Act land, a copy of the writ must be received by the proper land registrar
and recorded by him in the appropriate register: see Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.
230, s. 137.) Since land is rarely sold under a writ, creditors need not be too aggressive
with respect to such property; in most cases, they will simply wait until the debtor sells
or mortgages his land, at which time the outstanding money judgments will be paid.
However, the situation is different in the Ontario Small Claims Courts, where
creditors are more likely to be aggressive because of the existence of a first come, first
served regime: see Creditors'ReliefAct,R.S.O. 1980, c. 103, s. 3. Moreover, the binding effect on goods provided by s. 10(1) of the Execution Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 146,
while admittedly limited (in view of the protection for bona fide purchasers for value
and without notice) does not apply to Small Claims Court enforcement: s. 10(3).
Accordingly, while some higher court creditors might well be satisfied by mere delivery
of their writs to the sheriff, Small Claims Court creditors cannot bind their debtors'
goods without an actual seizure.
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"integrated and co-ordinated enforcement office responsible for the enforcement by virtually all means of judgments from all court levels":
While the state should take a role considerably more active than that assumed at
present, a balance should be struck between creditor initiation and control and
state involvement. The new enforcement office should exercise expanded,
although nonetheless basically traditional, enforcement jurisdiction, similar to
that now exercised by the sheriff. Necessary flexibility should be introduced by
means of express provisions in the governing legislation rather than by means of a
broad judicial and administrative discretion to be exercised by a state official. 19
This more or less orthodox approach 20 to the role of the state in the enforcement of judgment debts varies substantially from the recommendations made
by some other law reform agencies. Unlike the Ontario Law Reform Commission, these other bodies did not reject the second option considered by the
Commission - that is, "a reorganized enforcement office ... integrating enforcement activities from all court levels, but exercising broad discretionary
judicial and administrative powers specifically designed to tailor enforcement
measures to meet the requirements of each individual enforcement
21
situation."
This second, more radical, alternative is most vividly illustrated in the
New Brunswick Report, 22 at least in that part of the report containing proposals for a wholesale change in the organization of enforcement activities.
The nature and scope of the New Brunswick approach are described by the
Ontario Law Reform Commission in the following passage:
With respect to the organization and jurisdiction of the proposed unified enforcement regime, the New Brunswick Report contemplated the appointment of an 'official responsible for enforcement' who would be given extremely broad 'administrative' and 'judicial' powers. The official would be empowered to engage in
the following activities: conduct a hearing prior to a decision regarding the method
of enforcement to be followed; commence his own investigation concerning the
financial circumstances of the debtor; decide on the best method of enforcement
with respect to the particular debtor before him; review and vary prior enforcement decisions; designate which assets of the debtor are to be realized to satisfy the
judgment and determine the sequence and method of realization; deal with the
debtor's assets in the same manner that the debtor himself could have done prior
to the commencement of enforcement proceedings against him; specify a percent9
1 OLRC
20

Report, Part I at 109-10.
The Ontario Commission stated that its approach was "more in keeping with the
general philosophy of our judicial and enforcement system": OLRC Report, Part I at
110. In the words of the U.K. PayneReport at 103, para. 380:
[A] private debt does not cease to be private by being transformed into a judgment debt. The use of judicial institutions to convert a claim for a debt or
damages into a judgment debt does not impose a duty of collecting that debt
upon the State. The creditor retains the initiative as to how he should proceed to
enforce judgment.
21
OLRC Report, Part I at 110. However, it should be noted that the Commission
did countenance some measure of discretion on the part of the sheriff. For example, the
creditor would be permitted "to authorize the enforcement office to use any and all enforcement measures essential to enforce the judgment, without necessarily specifying
which particular measures ought to be employed." (id. at 138) The sheriff would then
be empowered to choose which enforcement method or methods ought to be pursued.
22

Supra note 3.
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age of non-exempt income that is to be attached; agree with the debtor to enter

into an instalment payment scheme in lieu of or in addition to exercising any other
enforcement powers; require judgment debtor examinations; and stay enforcement measures upon an appeal from the judgment or because the debtor is unable
to pay without depriving himself or his dependants of the necessities of life.
The mere listing of these broad discretionary powers makes abundantly clear the
comprehensive and far-reaching nature of the proposals respecting the jurisdiction

of the proposed new enforcement office. The fundamental concept is, at least in
part, to integrate, coordinate and centralize all enforcement activities in one office, and to attempt to tailor enforcement measures to the particular judgment
debtor. For these purposes, the state is to assume virtually total control over all enforcement decisions and activities made or taken in respect of the debtor. While an
enforcement decision made by the official may be appealed, the scope of the
jurisdiction of the official to grant or withhold rights with respect to the enforcement of judgment debts is substantial .... 23
A very similar approach to the one advocated in the New Brunswick
Report and in the New South Wales Report 24 was adopted in the Judgments

(Enforcement) Act (Northern Ireland), 1969,25 an outgrowth of the 1965
Northern Ireland Report. 26 That report proposed the creation of a new Enforcement Office that would exercise virtually total control over the enforce-

ment of money judgments. This approach was made manifest, for example, in
sub-section 13(2) of the 1969 legislation, which provides as follows:
The method of enforcement of a money judgment shall be in the discretion of the

[Enforcement of Judgments] Office and an applicant for enforcement may not re-

quire the use of any particular method.

It is, of course, not the purpose of this review to enter the fray in respect
of the legitimate role of the state in enforcing a judgment debt. Suffice it to
note that the Ontario Commission rejected the notion that the state should be
able to deprive a creditor of what the Commission considered to be the
legitimate fruits of his or her judgment; it therefore did not find compelling
the New Brunswick Report's arguments in favour of a regime that in every
case would tailor enforcement to individual debtors, 27 citing the likely unpredictability, delays, inconsistencies, and high costs of such a system. But it
should at least be noted that the New Brunswick approach, involving substantial state intervention, could serve to minimize unjustifiable debtor harassment
by what Professor Dunlop calls aggressive creditors bent on collecting their
judgment debts at almost all costs.

23 OLRC Report, Part I at 109. Footnote reference omitted.
24
Supra note 3. The jursidiction of the proposed Registrar of Judgments was
described as follows (at 13, para. 4.3: footnote reference omitted):

On application by the judgment creditor for enforcement (or by the judgment
debtor for an order to pay by instalments) the Registrar would (a) ascertain the debtor's means;

(b) decide upon and institute an appropriate mode of enforcement.
25 Pub. Gen. Acts N.I., c. 30.

26
Supra note 3.
27

OLRC Report, Part I at 112-13. Even the New Brunswick Report acknowledged
some problems with government involvement: see New Brunswick Report, supranote 3,

at 243.
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D. Imprisonmentof the Debtor
The meat of Professor Dunlop's book begins in chapter 5, dealing with
imprisonment of the debtor and examinations in aid of execution. It is from
this point on that the author assumes that "the
debtor has no defence to the
' 28
creditor's claim or has chosen not to assert it."
As usual, Dunlop discusses the historical antecedents of the law and,
more particularly, the law in England and its transmittal to North America. In
this connection, brief mention might be made of Dunlop's discussion of the
applicability of the English Debtors Act, 186929 in Alberta. 30 Dunlop notes
that the English statute abolished imprisonment as a general remedy after
judgment, subject to certain exceptions. In Alberta, An Act respecting the Imperial Debtor'sAct of 1869,31 passed in 1908, provided in section 1 that the
DebtorsAct, 1869 "shall not be in force or effect in the Province of Alberta
from and after the date of the coming into force of this Act." The author then
asks this question: "Did the Alberta Act, by declaring the 1869 statute not to
be in force in the province, have the unexpected consequences of reviving imprisonment as it existed prior to that date? '"32 While Dunlop asserts that,
despite the general assumption that there has been no such revival, "the point
is by no means free from uncertainty on a strict reading of the law," 33 he
makes no mention of clarifying legislation in Alberta in 1909. In that year, the
Legislature passed An Act to Amend the Statute Law, 34 section 20 of which
provided as follows:
The Act respecting the Imperial Debtors' Act of 1869, being chapter 6 of the
statutes of 1908, is amended by adding at the end of section 2 thereof the following:
And nothing herein contained shall be deemed to have brought into force within

the province the law of England as to arrest or imprisonment for making default in
payment of a sum of money as the same existed either immediately prior to the

passing of the said Imperial Debtor'sAct of 1869, or in the year 1670; and it is

hereby declared that the said law of England as to arrest or imprisonment for making default in payment of a sum of money as the same existed at either of the dates
mentioned isnot in force in the province.
E. Judgment Summons Proceedingsand Examinationsin Aid ofExecution
In the second portion of chapter 5, Dunlop juxtaposes the "judgment
summons process" and "examinations in aid". In part, the former has very
much the same purpose as the latter - to examine the debtor in order to dis2 Dunlop at 91. This assumption is a trifle misleading, since, at 102 et seq., Dunlop
discusses the Ontario FraudulentDebtorsArrest Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 177, pursuant to
which a debtor can be arrested before judgment.
2932 &33 Vict., c. 62.
30

Dunlop at 100.

31

S.A. 1980, c. 6. In Saskatchewan, see An Act respecting the ImperialDebtors'
Act of 1869, S.S. 1918-19, c. 83.
32

Dunlop at 100.

33
Id.at
34

100-101. Footnote reference omitted.
S.A. 1909, c. 4. No such remedial legislation was needed in Saskatchewan, since
the 1918-19 Act, supranote 31, made it clear that the pre-DebtorsAct, 1869 law did not
apply in that province.
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cover, inter alia, his income and assets. In both cases, the mere existence of an
unsatisfied judgment is sufficient to warrant the commencement of pro35
ceedings.
However, the "judgment summons process" involves more than an attempt to uncover what is garnishable or exigible. Having regard to the results
of the examination, the judge is empowered to order payment either immediately or at some future date, or to make an order for the payment of the
judgment by instalments. If the debtor defaults, a second summons - generally called a "show cause" summons - may be issued. If he does not attend
and if such nonattendance is "wilful", or if he fails to respond satisfactorily to
the questions asked of him, the debtor may be imprisoned for contempt. Nonwilful default ordinarily results in a further opportunity for the debtor to obey
the court order. Provision is also made for the variation or rescission of an instalment payment order.
The examination in aid process is restricted to fact-finding on the part of
the judgment creditor. In this connection, it is not entirely clear why Dunlop
cites Rules 587-96 of the Supreme Court of Ontario Rules of Practice as illustrative of "composite remedies with elements of both processes" 36 - that
is, judgment summons and examination in aid. His description of the examination process seems to belie this contention. Rules 587-96 do not, in fact,
permit the judge - who does not conduct the examination and who need not
be involved at all in authorizing the examination if commenced pursuant to
Rule 587(1) - to make orders for the payment of the judgment debt, whether
immediately or at some future date, or by a lump sum or an instalment payment plan.
One interesting development with respect to examinations is the use, or
proposed use, of questionnaires administered on the debtor in lieu of, or in addition to, an oral examination. The Payne Report gave the following advantages of a questionnaire:
(a) ...it would avoid the need for the parties to attend the Enforcement Office
and would save considerable time and expense;
(b) ...it would be cheap;
(c) ...it would be quicker; and
37
(d) ...it would provide information in a standardised and permanent form.
Indeed, "the questionnaire will obviate the need for the oral examination of
38
many debtors."
The reaction to suggestions that a questionnaire be employed has been
mixed. With respect to New South Wales, where questionnaires are employed,
the New South Wales Report did not propose their discontinuance, but clearly
35Insome jurisdictions, a creditor must file an affidavit, in the case of a second or
subsequent judgment summons, stating his belief that the debtor is able to pay all or
part of the judgment. See, e.g., Small Claims Courts Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 476,
s.131(4)(b).
36
Dunlop at 112 and 112n. 31.
37
Payne Report,supra note 3,at 121, para. 450.
38
Id. at 124, para, 463.
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was not entirely sanguine as to their efficacy. 39 While the Northern Ireland
Report 4° recommended that creditors be given an option either to seek an oral
examination or to have an enforcement officer attend upon the debtor to complete a questionnaire, the Judgments (Enforcement) Act (Northern Ireland)
196941 made no provision for questionnaires.
The New Brunswick Report was even more vociferous in its criticism and
rejection of the use of questionnaires:
It is doubtful that an examination by mail would be adequate since no form could
be devised that would adequately cover all contingencies. To the extent that the
form was designed to cover a number of possible situations, it would become so
complex that many debtors would experience difficulty in completing it. Only a
personal interview by an official experienced in this sort of inquiry is likely to produce adequate information promptly. Moreover, just as defaulting debtors ignore
other written documents directed towards collection, including the writ of summons, many
debtors are likely to simply ignore a mailed form for examination of
42
debtors.
However, the Ontario Law Reform Commission has endorsed the recommendations made in the Northern Ireland and Payne Reports. The Commission's proposals are rather long and complicated. For our purposes, the
following recommendations should be noted:
157. Before a creditor is entitled to demand an oral examination of the debtor, he
should be required to make use of a judgment debtor questionnaire.
158. Where a creditor initiates active enforcement measures against a debtor, the
enforcement office should be required, upon the instructions of the creditor:
(1) to mail to the debtor a judgment debtor questionnaire. The questionnaire, in prescribed form, should seek information concerning the debtor's employment and assets, and any other information usually obtained
on a judgment debtor examination; or, alternatively,
(2) to serve the questionnaire personally on the debtor, with an enforcement officer administering it (that is, requiring the debtor to complete
it) upon service. 43
Provision is also made for oral examinations where the questionnaire is "incomplete, inaccurate or insufficiently or fraudulently answered. '" 44 The Commission was of the view that its proposals would reduce debtor harassment and
inconvenience without prejudicing creditors.
F. Execution Against Real andPersonalProperty
As might be expected from Professor Dunlop's previous writing on the
subject, 45 his newest effort canvasses exceedingly well the historical develop39

Supra note 3, at 48.

40 Supra note 3.
41

Pub. Gen. Acts N.I., c. 30.
Supra note 3, at 280-81.
43
OLRC Report, Part I at 190.
"Id., recommendation 161.
45
Dunlop, Execution againstPersonalPropertyin Englandand British Columbia
(1972), 7 U.B.C.L. Rev. 171, and Execution againstReal Propertyin British Columbia
(1973), 8 U.B.C.L. Rev. 246. See also, Some Aspects of the Charging Order as a
Remedy for UnsecuredCreditors(1967-68), 3 U.B.C.L. Rev. 83.
42

1982]

Book Review

ment of the law respecting execution and writs of fierifacias. This introduction is essential to any real understanding of execution law because of the immense influence of the English common law on existing Canadian jurisprudence. Professor Dunlop describes this rather confusing legacy and attempts
to isolate those areas in which it has been altered to meet the needs of different
communities.
One holdover from medieval England relates, of course, to the very
means by which a judgment creditor may seek to satisfy his judgment. More
specifically, Dunlop notes that, except for Nova Scotia and Prince Edward
Island, all or most of the old writs - for example, fierifacias, sequestration
and attachment - survive intact. 46 Professor Dunlop rightly decries the need
for separate and distinct processes to satisfy a judgment from a debtor's
goods, lands, wages
or salary, and so on; he would "replace them with one all47
purpose remedy."
In some instances, more than one remedy - with different procedures
and safeguards - may be employed to obtain the same property of the debtor. For example, sub-section 19(2) of the Ontario Execution Act provides as
follows:
The sheriff may seize any book debts and other choses in action of the execution
debtor and may sue in his own name for the recovery of the moneys payable in
respect thereof.
49
Professor Dunlop notes that this piece of legislation, enacted in 1929,
"literally appears to make exigible all choses in action whatever, including
book debts, despite the existence in 1929 and at present of an attachment of
debts [or garnishment] process which would appear to accomplish the same
objective, at least as far as book debts are concerned." 50
The legitimacy of using sub-section 19(2) - and, therefore, a writ offieri
facias to seize money owing to a judgment debtor - was cast in doubt in
Sheriff of the County of Waterloo v. Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Canada.51
In that case, the debtor's debtor was served with a notice of seizure (issued, as
a matter of practice, pursuant to a writ of fierifacias)purporting to seize "all
monies due or accruing due" to the debtor. The debtor's debtor ignored the
notice of seizure and paid the debtor. Costello Co. Ct. J. held that the notice
of seizure procedure could not be used to collect the money owing to the debtor 52; rather, garnishment was the proper, and presumably only, method.
46 It should be noted that, in many jurisdictions, the term "writ of execution" is
defined expansively to include all writs by which a money judgment may be enforced.
See, e.g., O.R.P. 2(t), and s.l(a) of the ExecutionAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 146.
47Dunlop at 141. The notion that the present welter of different remedies and processes ought to give way to single, more comprehensive method of enforcement was put
forth48in, for example, the OLRC Report, Part I at 124.
Execution Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.146.
49
The Execution Act, 1929, S.O. 1929, c. 35, s. 5.
50
Dunlop at 159.
51[1967] 1O.R. 131, 59 D.L.R. (2d) 660 (Co. Ct.).
52This view seems to have been adopted in the New Brunswick Report, supra note
3, at 14n. 5. See also id. at 19n. 11.
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Costello Co. Ct. J.'s view of the ambit of sub-section 19(2) was expressly
rejected by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Re Attorney-Generalfor Ontario
and Royal Bank of Canada.5 3 While Brooke J.A. agreed that garnishment was
the usual method of collection, he stated that the clear language of sub-section
19(2) permitted a creditor to employ the alternative method of seizure under a
writ.
In discussing the Royal Bank case, Professor Dunlop notes its "dramatic
consequences" for Ontario, whereby "all choses in action, including book
debts, are exigible pursuant to a writ of execution whether or not they can be
said to be capable of physical possession and regardless of the state of the common law or of statute law before 1929. ' ' 54 By way of apparent contrast, he
cites the OLRC Report, which, he says, "takes a much narrower view of the
impact of the Royal Bank cases." It is a curious observation. Most of the
passages that he cites from the OLRC Report 56 have nothing to do with the
Royal Bank case or sub-section 19(2), but are either general comments dealing
with the present "non-exigibility of certain types of personal property," notwithstanding the broad language of section 18 of the Ontario Execution Act,
or with sub-section 19(1) of that Act, or with "cheques, bills of exchange and
promissory notes."
However, while the Ontario Law Reform Commission expressly noted
that "a notice of seizure [and, therefore, a writ offierifacias] may still be used
to collect amounts payable in respect of 'book debts and other choses in action'," the Commission recommended that, as a matter of policy, and except
in respect of negotiable instruments, "all such collection ought to be subsumed
under and effected through the proposed garnishment procedure." 57 Accordingly, the report said, "the right of a sheriff under section [19(2)] to institute
legal proceedings to collect the amounts due, and the practice involving a
notice of seizure as an alternative means of collection, should be abolished." 58
The Commission justified the retention of but one method of collection
on three grounds, all of which - and particularly the inappropriateness of
having two remedies designed for the same purpose - seem reasonable in
light of the enforcement regime proposed by the Commission. First, the proposed new garnishment remedy would be an expanded, continuing one, so that
all debts, including sub-section 19(2) debt obligations, would be reached by
this method. Secondly, sheriffs rarely commence legal proceedings as envisaged
by sub-section 19(2), presumably because garnishment is a much more

53 [1970] 2 O.R. 467, 11 D.L.R. (3d) 257 (C.A.).
54 Dunlop at 160-61.
55Id. at 161 n. 43.
56

OLRC Report, Part II at 25-31 and 39-53.
1d. at 45. See the contrary recommendations, at least in part, in Law Reform
Commission of British Columbia, Report on Attachment of Debts Act (1978), supra
note 58
3, at 56 et seq.
OLRC Report, Part II at 45. However, the Commission recommended that, "in
addition to the physical seizure of any document representing the debt obligation, the
use of a notice of seizure should be available as a means of seizing the property described
above for the purposes of sale". (id., at 46)
57
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available remedy. Thirdly, the new dispute resolution procedures proposed by
the Ontario Commission59were said to "offer the garnishee and others adequate
safeguards in all cases."
A final word respecting execution against personalty concerns the rather
sorry state of the law dealing with the exigibility of shares in a so-called
''private company".
The problem may be illustrated by the Ontario legislation. Section 14 of
the Execution Act permits the seizure and sale of, inter alia, "shares ... in...
a corporation having transferable shares. . . ." The remaining provisions in
section 14 expound on this basic principle. Then section 15 provides:
If a sheriff seizes the shares of an execution debtor in a private company, he shall
first offer them for sale to the other shareholders or any one of them in such
private company, and if none of them will purchase the shares for a reasonable
price, the sheriff may then offer the debtor's interest therein for sale to the public
generally and sell and convey to the highest bidder.
Nowhere in the Execution Act is the term "private company" defined. It is not
used in the Business CorporationsAct, 60 but is used in the CorporationsAct 61
and the Securities Act, 62 where it is defined basically to mean a company in
whose instrument of incorporation (a) the right to transfer its shares is
restricted; (b) the number of its shareholders cannot exceed fifty; and (c) any
invitation to the public to subscribe for its securities is prohibited.
Prior to the enactment of section 15 in 1929,63 Dunlop states, "there was
considerable doubt whether company shares with restricted transferability
were exigible at all."' 64 Dunlop cites the Ontario case of Re Phillips and La
Paloma Sweets Ltd., 65 which held that the reference to a corporation having
"transferable shares" meant freely transferable shares - that is, shares in a
"public", but not a "private", company. Dunlop then concludes that
"[s]hares in private companies or any other companies with restrictions on
transferability were therefore not exigible" prior to the enactment of section
15 in 1929.66
The lesson to be learned from Re Phillipsmay not be so easily stated, for
it is a rather troubling (and, to some, troublesome) case. The real issue was
whether the purchaser at a sheriff's sale was entitled to "a mandatory order
directing the proper officers of La Paloma Sweets Limited, an incorporated
company, to record a transfer of shares of the company's stock and to issue a
proper share-certificate to the applicant." 67 The Court refused to make such
an order. The debtor could not sell his shares except subject to the restrictions
59

Id. at 196.

6o R.S.O. 1980, c. 54.

R.S.O. 1980, c. 95, s. 1(h).
R.S.O. 1980, c. 466, s. 1(1)31.
63 The Execution Act, 1929, S.O. 1929, c. 35, s. 4.
"Dunlop at 165.
6S(1921), 51 O.L.R. 125, 66 D.L.R. 577 (H.C.).
Dunlop at 165-66.
67
Supranote 66, at 126 (O.L.R.), 177-78 (D.L.R.).
61
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on transferability, and a creditor (and, therefore, a sheriff) could obtain no
higher right than the debtor.
At this juncture, then, no one appeared to question the exigibility, as a
matter of law, of private company shares. The Court did not state that, since
shares were not exigible at common law, only clear statutory language, which
did not then exist, could make them exigible, although this may have been
behind the Court's assertion that what is now section 14 did not apply to
private company shares. But a nagging question remains. Why did the Court
examine the issue of the directors' refusal to record the transfer of shares to
Phillips if, in fact, private company shares were simply not exigible by means
of a writ of fierifacias, as Professor Dunlop has suggested? The 1929 enactment of section 15 served only to complicate matters. If Re Phillipsis still good
law in Ontario, the procedures in section 14 for the seizure and sale of shares
are not applicable to private company shares. But, then, what procedures are
to be used? Section 15 is singularly unhelpful, since its opening flush ("If a
sheriff seizes. . .") simply presupposes a seizure.
One reaction to Re Phillips, at least insofar as the issue of the directors'
refusal to record a transfer of shares is concerned, appears in the British Columbia case of Associates FinanceCo. Ltd. v. Webber. 68 In this case, Anderson
J., expressly refusing to follow Re Phillips, overturned the orthodox common
law rule that the transferee cannot obtain any greater interest than that of the
debtor. He stated that the discretion in the directors to refuse to register an intended transferee of private company shares was not effective against the
sheriff and the transferee from him. It was this view that Professor Dunlop
legitimately finds "at first blush . . .surprising, even heretical .... -69
However, while Dunlop states that "the common law principle relied on by
Anderson J. rests on very shaky foundations" 70 (presumably less dangerous
than being "heretical"), he suggests that the case "may be supportable on the
basis of s. 22 of the British Columbia Execution Act ....)M
Section 22 dealt with the rights and obligations of transferees in a manner
akin to the final part of sub-section 14(5) of the Ontario Execution Act.
However, the closing portion of section 22 also provided that "the proper officer of the company shall enter such sales as a transfer in the manner by law
provided."
It is by no means obvious that the quoted portion of section 22 supports
the contention of Anderson J. The operative phrase - "in the manner by law
provided" - may well beg the critical question concerning precisely what law
governs. Is it simply a reference to the relevant corporation law, and therefore
procedural, or does it include applicable enforcement law?
Moreover, the conflict in policy between Re Phillips and Webber is not
easily resolvable. While one may well sympathize with remaining
68 (1972),

28 D.L.R. (3d) 673, [1972] 4 W.W.R. 131 (B.C.S.C.).
Dunlop at 167.
70
1d. at 168.
71
Id. at 169. See, now, Court OrderEnforcement Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 75, s. 62,
which is almost identical in wording to s. 22.
69
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shareholders - unable to take up their right of first refusal under Ontario section 1572 - having to work with a "stranger" introduced into what may be a
small, closely-held family company, one must also leave some room to sympathize with creditors whose debtors seek to shield themselves behind their
private company shares.
The rather novel solution, or compromise, of the Ontario Law Reform
Commission ought to be noted here. The OLRC Report contains the following
proposals:
50.

With respect to the seizure and sale of private company shares under a writ
of enforcement, the following further rules are recommended:
(1) upon notice by the enforcement office to a private company, the directors or other officers of that company ought to be absolutely prohibited
from consenting to any transfer of shares by the debtor to another party,
and the company and its transfer agent or other authorized officer
should be prohibited from registering any such transfer on the books of
the company;
(2) where the debtor beneficially owns 100% of the allotted shares, the
sheriff should be entitled to sell the seized shares and, without qualification, the purchaser should be entitled to be registered on the books of
the company as the new owner of the shares;
(3) where the transfer of the shares or the registration of a transferee on the
books of the company is subject to the consent or approval of the directors before taking effect, such consent or approval should not be arbitrarily or unreasonably withheld; and
(4) acting on behalf of the creditors, the sheriff should be entitled to apply
by way of summary application to the county or district court to overturn the directors' refusal. The onus of proving that the directors'
refusal was unreasonable or arbitrary ought to be on the sheriff. In
determining the issue, the court should have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the extent of the remaining
shareholding, the intended transferee (if known at the time), the enterprise in which the company
is engaged, and the locus of effective "con73
trol" of the company.
The above proposals immediately bring to mind the provisions of section
91 of the Landlordand Tenant Act. 74 In the context of residential tenancies,
sub-section 91(3) provides that "[a] tenancy agreement may provide that the
right of a tenant to assign, sublet or otherwise part with possession of the
rented premises is subject to the consent of the landlord and, where it is so provided, such consent shall not be arbitrarily or unreasonably withheld." In
other words, the Legislature has seen fit to interfere with the normal right of
landlords to rent premises to whomever they choose.
The analogy is not, of course, a perfect one. Most residential tenancy relations involve basically impersonal dealings between landlords and tenants, so
that, arguably, there is less justification for refusing to consent to a parting of
possession by a tenant. In the private company context, however, the execution sale of a debtor's shares to a "stranger" could be far more disruptive. On
72
Execution Act,
73
OLRC Report,
74

R.S.O. 1980, c. 146.
Part II at 295.
R.S.O. 1980, c. 232.
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the other hand, it does bear repeating that the present law in Ontario permits a
debtor to shield behind his private company shares to the obvious prejudice of
his creditors.
After canvassing in some detail execution against personalty, Professor
Dunlop sets forth in chapter 6 (entitled "Execution") the first portion of his
discussion concerning execution against land. (The second portion appears in
chapter 11, entitled "Seizure and Sale".) The consideration of land is
somewhat less satisfactory, or at least less comprehensive, than his admirable
excursion through the maze respecting execution against personal property.75
One area mentioned only in passing is that dealing with the vexing relationship between the execution process and the conveyancing of land. 76 It is of
such importance that some consideration of the main problems, and possible
solutions, might usefully be canvassed here in the context of Ontario law and
practice.
75 One quite rare slip for Professor Dunlop, or perhaps one development subsequent to delivery of his manuscript to the publisher, ought to be noted here. At page
170, it is stated that s. 153(1) of the Ontario Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 234
"makes it clear that as far as land registered under that statute is concerned the writ will
not bind until a certified copy has been received by the proper master of titles." Subsection 153(1) was repealed by s. 14(1) of The Land Titles Amendment Act, 1980, S.O.
1980, c. 49. The new provision, now s. 137(1) of the 1980 Revised Statues, c. 230 provides, inter alia, that "no registered land is bound by any writ of execution until a copy
delivered by the sheriff has been received and recordedby the land registrar." (emphasis
added) With respect to the continued relevance of what is now s. 137(3), see OLRC
Report, Part III at 75n. 13.
76See Dunlop at 173. Another interesting, and troublesome area of the law concerns execution against the interest of a joint tenant of land, discussed by Professor
Dunlop at 180 et seq. It bears noting that the inherent conflict between the surviving
joint tenant and the creditors of the deceased debtor-joint tenant is exceedingly difficult
to resolve. See, for example, Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report on
Execution Against Land (Vancouver, B.C.: The Commission, 1978); Manitoba Law
Reform Commission, Report on The Enforcement of Judgments: Part II: Exemptions
Under "The Judgements Act" (1980), supra note 3, at 18 et seq.; and OLRC Report,
Part III at 23 et seq. The Ontario Commission's compromise solution is as follows (id.
at 134):
9. Where a debtor is a joint tenant of land, the following rules should apply:
(1) the filing of a writ of enforcement against the debtor should not sever the
joint tenancy. Severance should occur only once the sheriff enters into a
binding agreement of purchase and sale with a prospective purchaser at an
execution sale;
(2) where the debtor dies before severance, but after sale proceedings have
been commenced, there should be a right of survivorship; however, subject to paragraph (3), the value of the debtor's interest in the hands of the
surviving joint tenant should be subject to a charge to the extent of the
debts of judgment creditors who have delivered writs of enforcement to
the sheriff; and
(3) with respect to the charge proposed above,
(a) in the distribution of the debtor's estate, the former joint tenancy interest should be resorted to for payment of debts only if the other
property of the debtor has been exhausted and the creditors' debts remain outstanding, and
(b) in order to determine the debtor's interest that should be available to
creditors, there should be a statutory prima facie presumption that,
where the deceased debtor and the surviving joint tenant were joint
tenants in law, they were also joint tenants in equity.
In other words, a surviving joint tenant would no longer have an unlimited right in all
cases to obtain the full interest of a deceased joint tenant-debtor.
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As is readily apparent to any solicitor with a real estate practice, the very
nature of a writ of fierifacias, operating as a general lien not registered directly
against the title to the land it binds, serves to complicate substantially the conveyancing of land registered under the Registry Act; 77 at the same time, it permits execution creditors to use the conveyancing process as an inexpensive
method of collecting their judgment debts. In effect, innocent strangers to the
debtor-creditor relationship - vendors, purchasers, mortgagors and mortgagees - rather than the execution creditors, now bear the bulk of the financial burden of uncovering land owned by execution debtors.
A writ offierifaciasdelivered to the sheriff binds all the land of the execution debtor that is situated within the sheriff's bailiwick and that is governed by
the Registry Act. 78 The writ also binds land that is acquired by a debtor subsequent to the delivery of the writ to the sheriff.
The system under which writs of fierifaciasbind land protects execution
creditors by ensuring that a writ delivered to the sheriff automatically acts as a
lien against all of the debtor's land within the applicable geographic limits so
that, unlike the situation in respect of personalty, the claims of the creditors
cannot be defeated by the interposition of any other party obtaining a subsequent interest through the execution debtor. 79 This system inevitably imposes
substantial costs on at least four groups of persons, all of whom have no connection with the debtor-creditor relationship: (a) prospective vendors and
mortgagors (where, of course, they are not the debtors in question); (b) prospective purchasers and mortgagees; (c) execution creditors; and (d) sheriffs.
For example, purchasers of land must assure themselves that their vendors can create in them the ownership bargained for, subject only to those
prior rights or interests to which the purchasers have agreed. In order to obtain
such assurance, a purchaser must conduct a search for writs of fierifaciasin
the sheriff's office. The initial search for writs is against all persons who have
owned the land in question over at least twenty years prior to the closing date
of the transaction. If a writ has been lodged against such a predecessor in title
when he owned the land, the writ, if properly renewed, would continue to bind
the land.80
77

R.S.O. 1980, c. 445. The following discussion will not deal with the effect of a
writ on land affected by the Land Titles Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 230. While the effect is
similar to that under the Registry Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 445, title is guaranteed by the
province and all writs binding land must appear on the register (see Land Titles Act,
R.S.O.
1980, c. 230, s. 47(6) ).
78
Execution Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 146, s. 10(1).
79
Execution Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 146, s. 10(1).
80 There is some debate respecting the length of time during which a writ, properly
renewed, can continue to bind the land. There appears to be no universal custom about
the period of time through which an historical search for writs is conducted. Some
lawyers rely on a restrictive interpretation of s. 45(1)(c) of the LimitationsAct, R.S.O.
1980, c. 240, and search executions against all owners only within the preceding twenty
years. Others rely on s. 23(2) of the LimitationsAct and Rule 566 of the Supreme Court
of Ontario Rules of Practice; accordingly, since they believe that a writ, once lodged
and continuously renewed, can bind land indefinitely, they may search executions
against owners even back to the Crown grant. Yet others rely on the forty year search
period established by the Registry Act (see Registry Amendment Act, 1981, S.O. 1981,
c. 17, s. 4), although their argument concerning the relationship between these provisions and the binding effect of a writ seems rather weak. See Dunlop at 364 et seq.
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Because land changes ownership quite frequently, there are usually many
past owners against whom an execution search must be conducted. Moreover,
since sheriffs' certificates respecting executions can be relied upon only by the
person requesting the certificate, each purchaser must conduct his own execution search, notwithstanding that many of the predecessors in title will already
have been cleared by prior purchasers making the same type of search.
While in theory the process of searching for executions against
predecessors in title seems simple enough, it gives rise in practice to serious
problems for purchasers. The major problem is often called the "similar
name" problem. Let us assume that at one time the land in question was owned
by someone named David Paul Webb, against whom an execution search is
conducted. The sheriff will not issue a clear certificate where he has on file
writs against persons with the identical or similar names - for example,
David Webb, Paul Webb, D. Paul Webb, or perhaps even Paul D. Webb. Yet,
what if the vendor is not the same person as any of the debtors against whom
writs have been lodged with the sheriff?8 ' The practical problems in resolving
the matter may be quite considerable, particularly where the execution search
is against a deceased predecessor in title (and assuming, of course, that the
relevant writs were delivered to the sheriff's office during the period in which
Webb owned the property).
In some cases, it may be possible to obtain an affidavit from the debtor's
creditor swearing that Webb the owner is not Webb the execution debtor.
Where this is not feasible, other, less satisfactory methods of resolving the
issue must be tried. For example, the creditor's solicitor may agree to swear an
affidavit respecting the identify of the debtor or, in some cases, the purchaser
may accept the admittedly self-serving affidavit of the vendor himself.
The "similar name" problem is inherent in the present enforcement and
conveyancing systems, where a writ operates as a general, "off-the-record"
lien and where historical searches are required each time land is sold. The
problem is magnified where the relevant owner has a common name, such as
Smith or Jones.
As if the "similar name" problem is not great enough when the initial execution search against all relevant owners is made, a purchaser may well be
forced to resolve the problem within a very short time-frame after the lastminute subsearch for executions has been undertaken against the vendor. In
some cases, the vendor and purchaser will be forced to agree to some sort of
escrow arrangement, whereby sufficient funds will be held in trust until adequate proof of non-identity can be procured; in other cases, last-minute problems will abort a sale entirely.
Whether it is the vendor or the purchaser who ultimately bears the brunt
of the inconvenience depends, in part, on the circumstances of each case.
While the vendor must satisfy the purchaser if the sale is to proceed, he may
8 See Silva v. Atkins (1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 570, 88 D.L.R. (3d) 558, 4 B.L.R. 209
(H.C.) and Bayham Investments Ltd. v. Gulf Oil CanadaLtd., unreported, Feb. 6,
1979 (Ont. H.C.). The latter case is reproduced in Laskin et al., supra note 7, at 323.
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simply refuse to do so and throw the problem into the lap of the purchaser.
The purchaser, meanwhile, suffers the uncertainty of not knowing the final
outcome.
In 1960-61, the Execution Act was amended to deal with the "similar
name" problem. 82 Section 11(1) now reads as follows:
Where the name of an execution debtor set out in a writ of execution is not that of
a corporation or the firm name of a partnership, the writ does not bind the lands
of the execution debtor unless,
(a) the name of the execution debtor set out in the writ includes at least one given
name in full; or
(b) a statutory declaration of the execution creditor or his solicitor is filed with the
sheriff identifying the execution debtor by at least one given name in full.
Whatever the impact of this provision was intended to be, it is quite clear that
the "similar name" problem continues to plague parties to real estate transactions.
In the course of its deliberations on enforcement law, the Ontario Law
Reform Commission became convinced that the benefits conferred on execution creditors by the present conveyancing and registration arrangements were
clearly outweighed by the costs to virtually all other interested parties.
The Commission considered two alternative long term proposals for
reform; (a) province-wide binding of a writ against land, and (b) abolition of
the writ as a general lien and the mandatory registration of a writ directly
against the title in order to bind the land.
The Commission justifiably rejected the first alternative, notwithstanding
that it would resolve most of the concerns of creditors, essentially because
"the writ of execution would continue to be an off-the-record claim" 83 - that
is, a general lien binding all Registry Act land in Ontario without any requirement that it be registered directly against the parcel sought to be bound. As a
result, this alternative would perpetuate the present, unsatisfactory system in
which some interest affecting land are not registered directly against the title.
Moreover, the first alternative is not compatible with current Ontario plans to
centralize as much information as possible in one, central register.
There was also a practical reason for rejecting province-wide binding: it
would significantly aggravate the "similar name" problem described earlier,
by making it province-wide, instead of county-wide, in scope. The potential
costs and frustration could be astonishing.
Accordingly, the Commission chose the second alternative. Following
developments and proposals in British Columbia, 84 Manitoba,8 5 and On82
The Execution Amendment Act,
83
96.

1960-61, S.O. 1960-61, c. 25, s. 2.
OLRC Report, Part III at
84 Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report on Execution Against
Land (1978), supra note 76; and, Court OrderEnforcement Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 75,
s. 79 85
et seq.
Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Report on The General Register (1980),
supranote 3.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 20, No. 4

tario, 8 6 the Commission recommended the abolition of the writ as a general
lien and its replacement by a requirement that all writs must be registered
directly against the title of land that is to be bound.
The Commission's break with traditional enforcement principles respecting execution against land was not espoused, however, without recognition
that a careful balancing of competing interests was required, rather than a
clear-cut, self-evident choice between good and evil. The Commission did
"acknowledge that some creditors might be prejudiced by a system of parcel
registration." ' 87 In recognition of the need to assist creditors who might not
know what land their debtors owned, the Commission recommended as
follows:
[W]e recommended the creation of an automated or computerized province-wide
index of landholdings for all land in Ontario. In this manner, creditors required to
register their writs of enforcement directly against the parcel will be able to obtain
information concerning land owned by their judgment debtors. The index clearly

should8 comprehend landholdings for both Registry Act and Land Titles Act
land. 8

Clearly, a type of "similar name" problem could arise under this system.
A creditor searching in the proposed new index of landholdings for land owned
by John Smith could obtain information on land owned by a great many persons in Ontario by that name. Accordingly, in order to permit easier matching
of landowners and debtors in the index, the Commission recommended that
individual identifying information should be required on all writs (with respect
to debtors) and all documents of title (With respect to purchasers of land). A
dispute resolution mechanism, similar in principle to sections 81 and 82 of the
British Columbia Court OrderEnforcementAct, 89 would be enacted, whereby

owners of land against which a writ has been registered would be notified and
permitted to dispute the registration. In addition, provision for an award of
damages or costs, payable to an owner in respect of an erroneous filing, was
contemplated.
The Commission conceded that, in view of the time span before its long
term proposals could be adopted, and in view of the serious nature of the
problems described earlier, it was necessary to propose short term measures.
For example, in order to help alleviate any "similar name" problem that might
arise during the final subsearch for executions, the Commission recommended
"that a writ should not bind a debtor's land until the expiry of ten calendar
86 Land

Registration Management Committee, Property Rights Division, An In-

proved Land RegistrationSystem for Ontario (Toronto: Min. of Consumer and Commercial Relations, Aug. 1979). Volume 1 is subtitled An Executive Summary of the
Design Concepts and Recommendations, and Volume 2 is subtitled Design Concepts
andRecommendations.
87

OLRC Report, Part III at 106. See Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Report

on The
GeneralRegister,supra note 3, at 14 and 16.
88

OLRC Report, Part III at 109-10 (footnote references omitted). See similar proposals made in British Columbia (supranote 84), Manitoba (supra note 3) and Ontario
(supranote 86).
89

R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 75.
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days from the delivery of the writ to the sheriff ...." 90 As a result, there would
be ten days within which to resolve a "similar name" problem and no further
''similar name" problems could arise unexpectedly on or before closing.
In order to protect themselves during the ten days within which the writ,
continuing to operate as a general lien, would not bind land, a creditor would
be entitled under the Commission's recommendations to register a copy of his
writ directly against the title to the land owned by the debtor, with binding to
occur immediately upon such registration. While this would not protect a
creditor who was ignorant of land owned by his debtor, the Commission was
of the view that the costs of existing enforcement arrangements bore far too
heavily on innocent persons who had nothing to gain from such arrangements.
In a sense, then, a compromise solution was proposed - delayed binding
where the writ continued to operate as a general lien and immediate binding
where the writ was registered directly on title.
The Commission also sought to bring some order to the law respecting
what writs bind land and, therefore, what information sheriffs were obliged to
report to persons seeking execution certificates. 91 Finally, the Commission
considered the "enormous amount of wasteful duplication" 92 and the exacerbation of the "similar name" problem caused by the requirement of each new
purchaser of Registry Act land to conduct an historical search for executions
against relevant owners. The Commission was justifiably of the view that the
present need to conduct such searches was anomalous and completely unwarranted. Accordingly, proposals for reform were offered to eliminate the need
to conduct historical searches. 93
In making its long term and short term proposals for reform, the Commission was obviously animated by the belief that traditional enforcement
principles could not be viewed in isolation - detached from the realities of the
conveyancing process. Viewed in such isolation, it is, of course, not impossible
to justify the existence of a writ of fierifaciasas a general
lien binding all of a
94
debtor's property merely upon filing with the sheriff.
However, the Commission was firmly, and rightly, convinced that a
similar regime could not continue to exist in respect of land without seriously
undermining the conveyancing process. Moreover, as a matter of policy, it was
thought to be unjust to expect innocent vendors, purchasers, mortgagees and
mortgagors to bear the financial and emotional burden of serving, in effect, as
unwilling and inappropriate agents to collect the debts of others. The recommendation endorsing a direct parcel registration regime, even with an index of
landholdings, and the short term proposals for reform, were offered in full
90

OLRC Report, Part III at 117-18.
Id.at 139-40, Recommendation 21(7)-(11).
92
d. at 130.
93
Id.at 140-41, Recommendation 21(12)-(15).
94
Indeed, the Commission endorsed and expanded this principle in relation to the
binding of personal property: it recommended that a writ "filed in any enforcement office in Ontario should bind a debtor's goods throughout the Province, in the same fashion as a writ of execution now binds a debtor's goods within the county in which it is
filed ....
"Id., Part II at 17.
91
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recognition that no perfect solution was available and that some creditors
might indeed be prejudiced. But the proposals were seen as effecting a
reasonable and equitable shift in cost burden from innocent strangers to those
who at least have something to gain from the enforcement system.
With respect to short term measures designed to alleivate problems for
sheriffs in determining which writs ought to be reported by them where a
search is made in their offices, reference should be made to a recent directive
from the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General. 95 The rules governing
searches are as follows:
1. Searchesfor corporateorpartnershipnames
Only executions filed against corporations or partnerships with identical names

to those against which searches are requisitioned will be reported. A clear certificate issued with respect to a corporation or partnership will indicate that there
are no executions filed against a corporation or partnership with that exact name.
The sole exception to this rule will be that such searches will include searches
against the name plus corporate identifiers used (Limited, Incorporated, Corpora-

tion) and as well against the name plus the abbreviation of the particular corporate
identifier used.
2. Names of individuals

When a search is requested against the name of an individual, only writs of execution filed against judgment debtors with an identical surname and at least one
identical given name to the name against which the search was requested will be
reported. [emphasis added]

Two brief comments may be made in respect of the directive. First, while
the new guidelines may well be required to reduce problems for sheriffs and inconsistencies in reporting, they put the procedural cart before the substantive
horse. Before determining precisely what names ought to be reported by
sheriffs, it is clearly necessary to know what writs bind land. Since the virtually
non-existent case law96 is of little assistance, and since the legislation is silent,
reform in respect of the latter issue is urgently needed; the rules concerning
what executions must be reported will then follow inexorably.
Secondly, it appears that the new guidelines have, in the main, sharply increased the number of writs reported to solicitors and others - so much so
that the reaction to the directive apparently has been rather critical. Solicitors
who had, or who perceived, difficulties before in clearing names are now often
faced with what they consider to be a deluge of writs that might bind the land
in question. This problem is not, of course, unrelated to the first matter noted
above: the real issue is not the number of names to be cleared, but rather
whether the writs noted by the sheriff bind the land.
G. PrejudgmentRemedies

In chapter 7, Professor Dunlop canvasses prejudgment remedies and
absconding debtors legislation. Inevitably, given the exceedingly fast pace of
developments in respect of the Mareva injunction - whereby the disposition
95 Effective as of May 1, 1982.
96
See supra note 81.
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of a debtor's assets may be prohibited until judgment is obtained - the book
could not have pretended to be entirely au courant.
For example, Professor Dunlop notes that "[t]he remedy was first
granted in commercial cases involving liquidated claims but it has recently
been extended to tort actions in which the claim was for unliquidated damages
and in which liability was doubtful." ' 97 Dunlop cites the English case of Allen
v. Jambo Holdings Ltd.,98 a fatal accident case that has now been followed by
the Ontario High Court in Quinn v. Marsta Cession Services Ltd.99 In the latter case, which is under appeal, 100 Montgomery J. held that a Mareva injunction should issue in respect of a wrongful dismissal action. However, in Van
Brugge v. Arthur Frommer InternationalLtd., 011 Callaghan J. stated that a
Mareva injunction may well be inappropriate in a wrongful dismissal case.
Mareva injunctions have received favourable consideration in several
Canadian jurisdictions, 102 but their status remains very much in limbo. In view
of the fact that the law, at least in Ontario, "exhibits some confusion," Mr.
Justice Anderson held, in Chitel v. Rothbart,10 3 that the matter should be
referred to the Court of Appeal. While space does not permit any more than a
cursory look at the Court of Appeal decision, 1 4 it bears emphasizing that the
Court was unanimously of the viev - albeit by way of obiterdicta - that the
"Mareva injunction is here and here to stay and properly so". 105 However, "it
is not the rule - it is the exception to the rule" 106 set forth in Lister & Co. v.
Stubbs. 107 In order to prevent an abuse of what was called the "new" Mareva
injunction, 108 certain guidelines were adopted, essentially from the decision of
Lord Denning, M.R., in Third ChandrisShipping Corporationand others v.
9
Three of the guidelines - briefly, full and frank discloUnimarine S.A. 10
97 Dunlop at 190.
98 [1980] 2 All E.R.

502, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 1252 (C.A.).
99(1981), 34 O.R. (2d) 659.
100
See 13 A.C.W.S. (2d) 155.
101(1982), 35 O.R. (2d) 333, 16 B.L.R. 143 (H.C.).
102See, e.g., BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd. v. Hunt (1980), 23 A.R. 271
(N.W.T.S.C.); Manousakisv. Manousakis (1979), 10 B.C.L.R. P-21 (S.C.); Gundy v.
Gundy, [1981] 6 W.W.R. 355 (Sask. Q.B.); Elesguro Inc. v. Ssangyong Shipping Co.
(1980), 117 D.L.R. (3d) 105 (F.C. T.D.); Irving Oil Ltd. v. Biornstad,Biorn, and Co.
(1981), 35 N.B.R. (2d) 265 (Q.B.); and Humphreys v. Buraglia, unreported, Apr. 13,
1982 (N.B.C.A.).
For an interesting analysis of Mareva injunctions, see Gertner, Prejudgment
Remedies: A Need for Rationalization (1981), 19 Osgoode Hall L.J. 503. With respect
to the need to rationalize prejudgment remedies, see also Springman, Canadian ImperialBank of Commerce v. Sheahen: Setting Aside Default Judgment on Terms that
any Writ Stand PendingDispositionof theAction (1982), 3 Adv. Q. 365.
103 (1982), 36 O.R. (2d) 124 (H.C.).
104Chitel v. Rothbart(1983), 39 O.R. (2d) 513 (Ont. C.A.).
05
Id. at 44.
l06Id.
(1890), 45 Ch. D. 1; 59 L.J.Ch. 570; 38 W.R. 548.
107
08
1 Supra, note 104, at 44.
109[1979] Q.B. 645 at 668-69; [1979] 3 W.L.R. 122 at 137-38; [1979] 2 All E.R. 972
at 984-85 (C.A.).
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sure, full particulars of the plaintiff's claim, and an undertaking as to
damages - were regarded by the Ontario Court of Appeal as standard Ontario conditions respecting interlocutory injunctions. The last two - grounds
for believing that the defendants have assets in the jurisdiction and that there is
a risk that the assets will be removed or dissipated before satisfaction of any
judgment - were characterized as being unique to Mareva injunctions.
The Court in Chitel expanded slightly on these English guidelines. Most
significantly, perhaps, was its insistence that the applicant for a Mareva injunction have a "strong primafaciecase on the merits" - presumably, then,
not just a primafacie case or a "good" primafaciecase, and certainly not a
case that was simply not frivolous or vexatious. The Court's too briefly stated
rationale for adopting the "strong primafacie case" test appeared to be "that
the availability of the cross-examination transcript makes more legitimate a
preliminary consideration by the motions judge of the merits of the case" * 110
In short, an applicant for a Mareva injuncton will be required to meet a more
rigorous test than that applicable to interlocutory injunctions generally, having regard, for example, to American CyanamidCo. v. Ethicon.I
The Court of Appeal made it clear that, given the absence of full
disclosure, it would not continue the injunction in the instant case, so that its
views respecting the Mareva injunction were obiter,112 although obviously of
critical practical importance. However, the Court's attempt to consider the
Mareva injunction in some detail leaves several matters in some doubt. For example, is the "new" Mareva injunction remedy a comprehensive one, including within its ambit all similar types of prejudgment remedies? Early in
Chitel, the Court noted two exceptions to Lister & Co. v. Stubbs: where the
asset to be "frozen" by the interlocutory injunction is the very subject matter
of the litigation, and where a strong primafacie case of fraud or theft is made
out. 113 Will these continue to be recognized exceptions, along with the Mareva
injunction, or are we now dealing with but one prejudgment remedy respecting
injunctions?
In addition, is the Absconding DebtorsAct" 14 to fall within the four corners of the new remedy? Presumably not, as it offers a different type of
statutory prejudgment relief. But it is unfortunate - although predictable that the Act was, for the most part, ignored in view of the Court's general
discourse on prejudgment relief. This is, of course, characteristic of the present general attitude toward the various kinds of prejudgment relief; they are
seen as separate and distinct remedies, and this attitude is unlikely to change if
10 Supra note 104, at 19. "The Ontario court is in a better position than it would be
without such cross-examination to assess the respective merits of the parties ... with
regard to whether a strongprimafacie case has been established on the claim ..... (id.
at 42).
1 [1975] A.C. 396; [1975] 2 W.L.R. 316; [1975] 1 All E.R. 504 (H.L.). But see
supra note 104, at 17-19, concerning the test in Ontario with respect to interlocutory injunctions.
112 Supranote 104, at 14.
13Id. at 14-15.
n4 R.S.O. 1980, c. 2.
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the Court's position in Chitel simply rationalizes the Marevainjunction alone,
leaving all other types of prejudgment relief - even if only injunctive
relief - to await future intervention and rationalization by another court or
by the legislature.
H. GarnishmentofDebts
In chapter 8, Professor Dunlop turns to "[a]ttachment (or garnishment)
of debts ...undoubtedly the most powerful weapon in the arsenal of the
creditor." 11 5 Without canvassing the law of garnishment here, it should be
noted that, because in Ontario only present debts are garnishable, judgment
creditors must seek a new garnishment order as each debt arises. In other
words, continuing garnishment is generally unavailable. 116
However, notwithstanding the orthodoxy of this principle, reference
should be made to the recent case of Kraw v. Kraw. 117 In that case, Fisher
Prov. Ct. J., without any discussion, made a continuing garnishment order in
respect of moneys payable to one of the parties from O.H.I.P. The issue in the
case was whether such moneys were in fact garnishable, but the order itself is
interesting because of what appears to be its continuing effect. Such a radical
departure from received learning has not yet occurred elsewhere, despite its
8
obvious appeal.11
Exemptions
In chapter 10, Professor Dunlop canvasses exemption legislation in
Canada. While he stated earlier the inevitability of leaving out certain facets of
enforcement law, it is rather curious that no mention is made of the relevant
pensions. A brief
statutes affording protection to debtors in respect of their
19
word on such legislation therefore seems in order here. 1
I.

Some provisions, like those in the Ontario Public Service Superannuation
Act, 120 deal expressly with the exemption of the "interest" of the pensioner in
the relevant fund or in moneys payable, while others, like those in the Ontario
Pension Benefits Act, 121deal only with the exemption of "moneys payable"
under a pension plan. There is clearly a difference. In the absence of express
legislation, theoretically one could seize and sell a pensioner's "interest" as a
chose in action under sub-section 19(2) of the Execution Act, 122 but would
have to garnish "moneys payable". In all likelihood, this absence of uniformity
Dunlop at 211.
however, s. 30(1) of the Family Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 152, and
s. 34(6) of the Retail Sales TaxAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 454.
117
Unreported, May 24, 1982 (Ont. Fam. Ct.).
18 See proposals in OLRC Report, Part II, ch. 3.
9
11
See Springman and Gertner, "The Exigibility of Life Insurance, Pensions and
R.R.S.P.'s in Canadian Common Law Jurisdictions", Insolvency Bulletin, Vol. 2,
No. 10 (October, 1982) at 3, and to be continued in two forthcoming parts of the InBulletin.
solvency
120 R.S.O. 1980, c. 419, s. 34(1).
121
R.S.O. 1980, c. 373, s. 27(1).
122R.S.O. 1980, c. 146.
'5

116See,
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of language - an absence reflected in pension legislation across Canada does not signify a different intention on the part of various draftsmen; the differences probably represent the ad hoc process of development and amendment of the many Acts over a number of years.
Since Professor Dunlop does not mention pension exemptions, he does
not examine the rather unique status of support creditors under, for example,
two Ontario statutes. These two Acts - the Ontario Municipal Employees
Retirement System Act 23 and the Pension Benefits Act 24 - both contain
provisions that exclude Family Law Reform Act 25 support debtors from the
pension exemptions in those statutes; that is, a support creditor may, in fact,
garnish, attach, or seize moneys payable out of the applicable fund. 126
The obvious question why only two Acts contain such an important exception to the exemption provisions has been considered in Re Lamb and
Lamb. 127 In that case, Scott Co. Ct. J. considered whether the exception for
support debtors in the Pension Benefits Act was applicable to a pension
created under the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System Act,
which, at that time, did not contain a similar exception (now contained in subsection 12(2) ).
Scott Co. Ct. J. held that there was a clear conflict between the two Acts;
accordingly, reference had to be made to sub-section 1(3) of the Pension
Benefits Act, which provides that the Pension Benefits Act prevails in the
event of conflict with any other Act. He therefore resolved the conflict in
favour of an interpretation of the exception provision of the Pension Benefits
Act that would make that provision applicable to the Ontario Municipal
Employees Retirement System Act.
The rationale in Re Lamb andLamb is certainly not self-evident. At first
blush at least, it would seem that pension statutes other than the Pension
Benefits Act establish a reasonably comprehensive scheme to deal with the
pensions to which they are made to apply, and that the PensionsBenefits Act
was designed to govern the growing number of "private" pension plans for
which no specific legislation existed.
Of course, this would not explain why only one statute, excluding the
Pension Benefits Act, was amended to deal with support debtors and
creditors. Perhaps the 1979 enactment of sub-section 12(2) of the Ontario
MunicipalEmployees Retirement System Act simply reflected an abundance
of caution, since the litigation in Re Lamb andLamb was ongoing at the time
and it might well have been thought that it could be decided the other way. In
any event, the case has been cited with approval in Seymour v. Seymour 128 (a
123 R.S.O. 1980, c. 348, s. 12(2).
124 R.S.O. 1980, c. 373, s. 27(2).
125 R.S.O. 1980, c. 152.

126Reference should be made here to the broader provisions in s. 19(2) of Saskatchewan's The Pension Benefits Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. P-6, as am. by S.S. 1979-80,
c. 65, s. 9. Sub-section 19(2) permits enforcement proceedings (against moneys payable
under a pension plan) in respect of "an order or an interspousalcontract made under

The MatrimonialPropertyAct" (emphasis added).
127 (1979), 25 O.R. (2d) 23 (Co. Ct.).
128 (1981), 33 O.R. (2d) 347 at 350, 351 (Co. Ct.).
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case that is itself worthy of note, for it decided that a pension or a pension
benefit to which the PensionBenefits Act applied could not be attached or garin sub-section 27(2), to enforce a maintenance
nished, under the exception 129
order under the DivorceAct).
The absence of any discussion relating to pension exemptions may be contrasted with Dunlop's extended discussion of life insurance exemptions. In the
latter connection, it bears mentioning that the author does not really consider
the basis of the exigibility of an insured's interest in his unmatured policy, a
matter, it is suggested, that has been rather myopically perceived in the
jurisprudence (such as there is of it). Much of the debate has centred on
whether such property is exigible under sub-section 19(1) of the Execution Act,
dealing, inter alia, with the exigibility of "cheques, bills of exchange, promissory notes, bonds, mortgages, specialties or other securities for money" of
the debtor. The question debated is whether the insured's interest falls within30
the rubric "other securities for money." While the law is certainly not clear, 1
most courts have opted for an ejusdem generis reading of this phrase. For example, in Weekes v. Frawley,13 1 Boyd C., following Alleyne v. Darcy 132 and In
re Sargent'sTrusts, 133 held that a life insurance policy on which premiums had
yet to be paid was not exigible as "security for money". On the other hand, it
was held in The CanadianMutualLoan and Investment Co. v. Nisbet 34 that a
fully paid up policy was in fact exigible as "security for money".135
The debate seems sterile, even leaving aside the existence of statutory exemption provisions that are virtually uniform across Canada. In Ontario, for
example, one would have thought that a debtor's interest in his life insurance
policy would be exigible (obviously apart from statutory prohibition) under
either section 18 or sub-section 19(2) of the Execution Act. Section 18 provides
very broadly for the seizure and sale of "any equitable or other right, property,
interest or equity of redemption in or in respect of any goods, chattels or personal property", and sub-section 19(2) provides for the seizure of any chose in
action, which would include a debtor's interest in his policy. 136 Since, in the
absence of a statutory probibition (which exists in respect of certain types of
policies), a policy is assignable, with the assignee stepping into the shoes of the
129 R.S.C. 1970, c. D-8. Remedial legislation has, however, been introduced in On-

tario to overturn the Seymour decision: see cl. 5 of the proposed Pension Benefits
Amendment Act, 1982, Bill 178, 1982 (32d, Leg. Ont., 2d Sess.). New s. 27(2) of the
Pension Benefits Act would provide as follows:
27.-(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1), where a person is receiving payment
under a pension plan to satisfy the payment of pension benefits to which the person is entitled, the payment is subject to execution, seizure or attachment in
satisfaction of an order for support or maintenance enforceable in Ontario.
This provision would apply to orders made either before or after s. 27(2) comes into
force. 0
13 See New Brunswick Report, supra note 3, at 14n. 5.
131(1893), 23 O.R. 235 (Ch. D.).
132 (1855), 5 Ir. Ch. R. 55.
133 (1879), 7 L.R. Ir. 66.
134 (1900), 31 O.R. 562 (Div. Ct.).
135 See also Edwards, supranote 2, at 133.

136 Sub-section 19(2) has been given a very wide interpretation in Re Attorney
GeneralforOntarioand RoyalBank, supra note 53.
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insured,137 there seems to be no reason why a sheriff cannot seize and sell an
assignable life insurance policy under either section 18 or sub-section 19(2).
Why attention has been so firmly riveted on sub-section 19(1) is, again, not at
all clear.
Professor Dunlop's discussion of the main body of exemption law is
highly informative. However, his one half page reference to the exceptions
from exemptions deserves better treatment. For example, sub-section 7(1) of
the Ontario Execution Act provides that, subject to some exceptions, "[t]he
exemptions prescribed in this Act do not apply to exempt any chattel from
seizure to satisfy a debt contracted for the purchase of such chattel. .. ."
There appears to be almost universal agreement respecting the legitimacy of
this provision. But its rationale is not as self-evident as it might first appear.
The vendor-creditor has made a decision not to exact security from the
purchaser-debtor - a means of protection that he could employ if he felt in
need. Yet, after default, the creditor is accorded a type of statutory preference
or priority. Where there are several creditors, it seems inequitable to differentiate between them in the manner made manifest in sub-section 7(1); indeed, in
the absence of a security agreement covering the chattel in question, it is not
unreasonable to suppose that most creditors would perceive the sub-section
7(1) exception as an unexpected windfall. It was this reasoning that led the Ontario Law Reform Commission to defy custom and recommend the repeal of
sub-section 7(1).138
One exception briefly discussed by Professor Dunlop is that afforded to
maintenance creditors. Sub-section 7(2) of the Ontario Execution Act provides
that, with some exceptions, "[t]he exemptions prescribed in this Act do not apply to exempt any article from seizure to satisfy a debt for maintenance of a
spouse or former spouse or of a child. . . ." In discussing the sometimes
uneasy and unclear relationship between exemptions legislation and creditors'
relief legislation, Professor Dunlop raises the following issue:
[S]uppose that a spouse with a judgment for maintenance seizes property which
would be normally exempt. The execution is proper because the spouse falls within
one of the exceptions set out in the Exemptions Act. The property is sold. Must the
sheriff distribute the proceeds of sale among all creditors entitled to share under
the creditors' relief legislation? If he does what priorities must he take into

account? 139

Dunlop then contrasts the opposing views. "The obvious solution", he concludes, "is comprehensive and integrated legislation, failing which the courts
may have to make a difficult choice between the competing philosophies of
1
these different statutes." 40
In the OLRC Report, the Commission appeared to have no difficulty optfor
the protection of the maintenance creditor. Its position was as follows:
ing
[W]here the sheriff has knowledge of the fact that one of the execution creditors is
a maintenance creditor comprehended by section 7(2), ordinarily he will distribute
137 See InsuranceAct, R.S.O. 1980, c. 218, s. 174.
138 OLRC Report, Part II at 89-90.
139Dunlop

at 445. Footnote reference omitted.

140 Id. at 446.
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the proceeds of a seizure, up to the dollar amount of the exemptions provided in
section 2, exclusively to the maintenance creditor. For example, if the sheriff
knows of the existence of a maintenance creditor, he now can seize all of the debtor's household furniture without regard to the $2,000 exemption in section 2.2.
The maintenance creditor is given priority in respect of the first $2,000 collected as
the proceeds of a subsequent execution sale, and any surplus is distributed pro rata

The Commission's perception of the paramountcy of the protection for the
maintenance creditor under sub-section 7(2) over the general pro rata distribution scheme under the Creditors'ReliefAct seems unassailable, both as a mat-

ter of pure statutory interpretation and as a matter of policy.
Before leaving exemptions legislation, mention should be made of what
nature in light of
Dunlop calls its "antiquated, unclear and inappropriate"
"modern economic and social conditions." 142 He concludes, quite justifiably,
that "[r]eform of exemptions law in Canada is long overdue." 143 Noting that
"[t]he philosophy of the exemptions laws is to encourage the debtor to survive
and to carry on his life as an economic and social element in society,' 144 the
author expressly favours "a more expansive reading" of exemptions legislation. 145

Several law reform bodies have attempted to deal with the very unsatisfactory state of this legislation. The OLRC Report, for example, adopted a very
conservative, traditional approach, basically keeping the old categories of
while raising the dollar values and adding some new
exempt chattels,
46
categories. 1
Not surprisingly, this orthodox approach' 47 has come under severe attack
from several sources. The most sweeping criticism and set of reform proposals
may be found in the New Brunswick Report, in which the following statement
appears:
It would appear more satisfactory to provide a mechanism for individual discretionary determination of which assets should be made available in a particular
should take the form of general policy, rather than
debtor's case. Guidelines
48
detailed regulation. 1

Therefore, while the report also proposed the enactment of "[c]ertain minimal
guarantees of the debtor's interest similar to the existing statutory
exemptions," 149 the main thrust of the recommendations was to attempt to
tailor the exemption provisions to the needs of each debtor.
The Ontario Lav Reform Commission expressly rejected the proposals in
the New Brunswick Report as leading to unwarranted uncertainty and an un141

OLRC Report, Part II at 94-95. Footnote reference omitted.
at 315.

142 Dunlop
43

1 Id.
144 Id. at 320.
145 Id. at 321.
146 OLRC Report, Part II at 79-86.
147 The Commission stated that its approach "is more in keeping with the general
philosophy of our judicial and enforcement system." (id. at 110)
48
1 Supranote 3, at 262.
149 Id.
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due increase in time and money spent on determining the precise requirements
of each debtor, although the OLRC Report did acknowledge that "in theory
the complete individualization of exemptions may be a praiseworthy
objective." 150 Substantially more emphasis was placed by the Commission on
the critically important income exemption, 151 although even here the Commission did not endorse a discretionary exemption; rather, it opted in favour of a
percentage exemption subject to variation on the application of either the
debtor or creditor.
The Ontario Commission's rejection of a discretionary regime is consistent with its rejection of total, or even much greater, state control of the enforcement process, a matter discussed earlier. 152 Of course, other types of
regimes are possible. A recent working paper from the Alberta Institute of
Law Research and Reform 153 has set forth the following models of exemption
legislation: (1) selective and specific exemptions; 154 (2) lump sum exemptions,
which permit a debtor to choose whatever assets he wishes to retain up to a
stipulated dollar limit, 155 and; (3) some combination of (1) and (2).
J.

Seizure andSale
In chapter 11, Professor Dunlop returns to the writ of execution, mainly
to examine the seizure and sale of personalty and realty, although there is also
a useful discussion of limitation periods 156 and the duration and renewal of
writs of execution.
Dunlop then turns to the concepts of seizure and abandonment of
seizure - an area of debtor-creditor law that mixes both the physical (for example, the physical taking of goods) and what at times appears to be the
metaphysical (the sheriff's intention to seize the goods). Considerable discussion ensues respecting the sheriff's duties concerning seizure and his liability
for an excessive seizure and for seizing goods of a third party.
It is clear from a reading of the author's account of a sheriff's duties that
the latter walks a very thin rope indeed. So much can go wrong so easily. No
wonder it is a common practice - although of dubious validity - for Ontario sheriffs to demand an indemnification agreement from creditors'
solicitors, attempting to save sheriffs
harmless in respect of any action they
57
take in seizing and selling property. 1

150OLRC Report, Part II at 82.

151 Id. at 81. See also id. at 153-77.
152 See part III, C.
153 Alberta Institute for Law Research and Reform, Exemptions from Execution
and Wage Garnishment, Working Paper (Edmonton: Institute of Law Research and
Reform, 1978).
154 See, e.g., Execution Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 146, s. 2.
155 See, e.g., Court OrderEnforcement Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 75, s. 65.
15 6 See supranote 80.
157 Where a solicitor does not accede to this demand - which occurs only infrequently - it appears that sheriffs will attempt to execute the writ, so long as they have
sufficient information concerning the nature and location of the exigible property.
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The difficulty faced by sheriffs in knowing what property belongs to the
debtor has prompted many sheriffs to be excessively cautious, sometimes notwithstanding the giving of indemnification agreements. It is this difficulty that
prompted the Ontario Law Reform Commission to recommend a rather
dramatic change in the rules governing seizure. The Commission's discussion
and proposals are as follows:
We believe that there is yet a further means by which the problem of identification may be minimized without jeopardizing the interests of other parties involved.
We recommend that, upon a creditor's instructions, the sheriff should be required
to seize property in the sole or joint possession of the debtor. This duty should
arise, and the sheriff should be protected from liability, unless the sheriff, acting in
good faith, has some reasonable basis for believing that the property is not property
in respect of which the debtor has some exigible right, title or interest. Accordingly, where the debtor is in sole or joint possession of exigible personal property,
the sheriff should not be entitled to demand of the creditor, as a precondition to
seizure, evidence of the debtor's precise right, title, or interest in that property. 158
In connection with the last-mentioned proposal, the Commission also recommended that "the sheriff should not have to investigate the ownership of each
asset found in the debtor's possession or the validity of conflicting claims
made at the time of the attempted seizure." 15 9
The rationale for substantially liberalizing the law of seizure was given as
follows:
We believe that sole or joint possession in the debtor is a reasonable basis for seizing property, particularly given the safeguards in the present law and the
safeguards to be proposed by the Commission respecting the protection of the interests of claimants to property. Persons who permit their property to be in the
possession of another necessarily must take some risk. In an extreme case, one
such risk is that the property honestly may be mistaken for the debtor's property
without the debtor disabusing the sheriff of this erroneous belief. However, it may
be said that in most cases debtors do not fraudulently release to the sheriff the
property of others.[ 16° In fact, the reverse is more common: debtors frequently
seek to withhold property from the sheriff and their creditors. 161
Where property is in the sole possession of a third party, however, the
Commission in effect endorsed the caution displayed by sheriffs. In lieu of
physical seizure at the outset, where a creditor has instructed a sheriff to seize
property in the sole possession of a third party, the sheriff would serve on that
party a notice of seizure. Leaving aside the rather complicated proposals respecting the immediate disposition by the third party of his possessory or proprietary interest (if any) in the property, the third party would be afforded an
opportunity to make a claim to the property. Where no claim is made, or
where the right to seize is not disputed, the sheriff may physically take the
property into his custody.
158 OLRC Report, Part II at 32. Footnote references omitted.
159 Id. at 33. Concerning the discussion of such claims, see discussion infra.
160Author's footnote. With respect to the seizure of property in the debtor's
possession, see art. 569 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-25,
which provides, in part, that "[a] creditor may seize and sell the moveable property of
his debtor which is in the possession of the latter, that in his own possession and that in
the possession of third parties who consent thereto."
161OLRC Report, Part II at 32.
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The above proposals respecting the procedure to seize property were
designed to clarify the duty of the sheriff in various situations. The Commission sought to create a regime in which the exercise of discretion on the part of
sheriffs would be minimized. Other proposals were made in an attempt to deal
with claims to seized property. These latter proposals are radical in nature and
would serve to alter substantially the rights of persons who have a claim to
seized property.
As Professor Dunlop notes, the orthodox law is that, "[w]hen the seized
goods are sold by the sheriff, he conveys to the purchaser whatever title the
debtor had in the goods." 162 Dunlop describes the position of the purchaser as
follows:
The bidder at a sheriff's sale is in a difficult position. The sheriff will generally offer no promises either
as to his authority to sell or as to the title which the debtor
has in the goods.[ 1631 The purchaser is left very much on his own, and any bid he
makes involves a substantial gamble as to the validity and effectiveness of the
transaction. 164

As a result, it has been said that "at a forced sale prices are low as a rule, it is
an opportunity that buyers take in the hope of 'getting a bargain'."165
In an attempt to ensure that the highest possible price is obtained for seized
goods, the Ontario Law Reform Commission recommended an entirely
new - and, as indicated, very radical - regime designed to give possible
claimants an opportunity to make their claim, but to extinguish their interests
after the expiry of the proposed limitation period within which claims may be
made. The main recommendations, which, if implemented, would overturn
the present law, are along the following lines. 66 The Commission first proposed
that "[s]ubsequent to a seizure, the sheriff should be required to serve a 'notice
of seized property' and a prescribed proof of claim form on all persons who,
to the knowledge or reasonable belief of the sheriff, may have some right, title
or interest in the seized property." Leaving aside certain exceptions (for example, dealing with late claims), the person served with the notice would be entitled
as of right to file a duly completed proof of claim form with the enforcement
office within thirty days of the mailing of the notice to him by the sheriff. A
procedure is to be established for the adjudication of claims made to the seized
property. Then the critical recommendation is as follows:
199. At a sale of seized property, the purchaser should acquire clear title subject
only to the right, title or interest of a person who has filed and successfully
maintained a claim to such a right, title or interest prior to the time of sale;
the claim of any other person should be extinguished upon the sale of the
property.
162 Dunlop at 402. But see Associates Finance Co. Ltd. v. Webber, supra note 68
and accompanying text.
163 Author's Footnote. Concerning the title of a purchaser at an execution sale of
land, notwithstanding, for example, irregularities in seizure or sale, see Memorials and
Executions Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-9, s. 9; Court OrderEnforcement Act, R.S.B.C.
1979, c. 75, ss. 100-101; Judgment and Execution Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. J-2, ss.
36-38, 43-44 and 46; and Sale of Land under Execution Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 275,
s. 13. See, also, s. 36 of the Seizures Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. S-11, which provides, inter
alia, that a sale of goods "shall be without warranty of title."
164 Dunlop

at 402-403.

165 MapleLeafLumber Co.
166

v. Caldbick(1917), 40 O.L.R. 512 at 516 (App. Div.).
OLRC Report, Part II at 313-15, recommendations 193-201.
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However, a claimant whose right to the seized property has been extinguished
may file a claim to a "first charge" on proceeds of sale, so long as his claim is
filed "while the proceeds remain undistributed in the hands of the sheriff." In
short, a purchaser at an execution sale would always know precisely what interest he was acquiring -and, in some cases, where a claimant failed to assert
his claim within the limitation period, he would in fact acquire a better title
than that of the debtor. This foreknowledge would, it was assumed, result in a
higher price for seized chattels. Whether it would also affect the practices of,
for example, institutional lenders can only be a matter of conjecture, but it is
not unreasonable to speculate that they would view the proposals with some
antipathy.
K. Distributionof Proceeds
Chapter 12 is concerned with the distribution of proceeds among
unsecured creditors (and chapter 13 deals with the related topic of priorities of
secured and preferred creditors). Professor Dunlop here discusses creditors'
relief legislation in Canada, which, he states, is a "statutory system of compulsory sharing of the proceeds of execution among unsecured creditors." 167
However, not all unsecured creditors share under a pro rata distribution
scheme. For example, section 3 of the Ontario Creditors'Relief Act 168 is narrowly circumscribed. Section 3 provides that, "[s]ubject to this Act, there is no
priority among creditors by execution from the Supreme Court or from a
county court." No mention is made of execution creditors from a provincial
court (family division) or from a small claims court.
It has never been the subject of dispute that, subject to certain
exceptions, 169 execution creditors from the small claims courts are paid on a
first come, first served basis. However, there is some dispute concerning the
distribution of proceeds realized from an execution issued by a provincial
court (family division). The Ontario Family Law Reform Act 170 is silent, and
the Rules of the Provincial Court (Family Division) 171 are cryptic in respect of
this matter. Rule 80 provides that the sheriff executing the writ "shall make a
return of [the] writ of execution and pay to the clerk of the court on behalf of
the creditor any money available for distribution to the creditor."
The question is, what type of scheme governs the determination of
"money available for distribution to the creditor"? In practice, it appears that
the sheriff makes this determination as though the provincial court (family
division) creditor is to share pro rata under the Creditors' Relief Act.
However, the applicability of that Act is very much in question, having regard
to the language of section 3. Certainly Rule 80 offers no guidance on this matter; it really begs the critical question.
One area of significance not mentioned in chapter 12 deals with the
distribution of the estate of an insolvent debtor and the applicability of
creditors' relief legislation to an insolvent estate. Sections 50, 57, 58 and 59 of
167 Dunlop

at 415.

168R.S.O. 1980, c. 103.
169Creditors'ReliefAct,R.S.O.
0

17 R.S.O.

1980, c. 152.
171R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 810.

1980, c. 103, ss. 16 and 25.
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the Trustee Act 172 provide a code for the administration of insolvent estates.
For our purposes, only sub-section 50(1) need be reproduced:
On the administration of the estate of a deceased person, in the case of a defi-

ciency of assets, debts due to the Crown and to the personal representative of the

deceased person, and debts to others, including therein debts by judgment or
order, and other debts of record, debts by specialty, simple contract debts, and

such claims for damages as are payable in like order of administration as simple
contract debts shall be paid paripassu and without any preference or priority of
debts of one rank or nature over those of another; but nothing herein prejudices
any lien existing during the lifetime of the debtor on any of his property.
In Re Williamson, Pennell v. McCutcheon,173 execution creditors of the
deceased caused the sheriff to seize and sell the deceased's goods under their
writs of execution. The execution creditors sought to have the proceeds
distributed to them under The Creditors'ReliefAct. 174 It was noted that "[t] he
sheriff, desiring relief for the other creditors, maintains that all assets must be
distributed paripassuamong all the creditors" 175 pursuant to sub-section 63(1)
of The Trustee Act, 176 the lineal ancestor of present sub-section 50(1). Middleton J. held that sub-section 63(1) "abolished all priority among creditors in
administration of the estates of deceased persons" and that a writ "gave to the
[execution] creditor no priority over the other creditors." 177 He concluded that
The Creditors'Relief Act, dealing only with the rights of execution creditors
inter se, did not alter "the superior right of the creditors as78a whole to have the
assets dealt with as the statute [The Trustee Act] directs." 1
However, notwithstanding Middleton J.'s decision respecting the applicability of what is now sub-section 50(1) of the Trustee Act, a crucial question remains unanswered. Is sub-section 50(1) intra vires the province, having
regard to exclusive federal jurisdiction in matters of "bankruptcy and insolvency"? While the provision predates Confederation, and has yet to be
challenged, one may seriously question its validity, particularly in view of the
opinions expressed by various Supreme Court of Canada justices in Robinson
v. Countrywide FactorsLtd. 179 While that case dealt with section 4 of the
Saskatchewan Fraudulent Preferences Act, 180 various opinions make it
reasonably clear that a comprehensive provincial scheme for the distribution
of the estate of an insolvent person would
not likely receive a favourable recep8
tion in the Supreme Court of Canada.' 1
The invalidation of section 50 of the Trustee Act would, of course, severely
172R.S.O. 1980, c. 512.
173 (1917), 39 O.L.R. 413, 36 D.L.R. 783 (S.C.).
174
R.S.O. 1914, c. 81.
175 Supra note 173, at 414 (O.L.R.), 784 (D.L.R.).
176 R.S.O. 1914, c. 121.

177 Supra note 173, at 414 (O.L.R.), 784 (D.L.R.).
178 Id. at 415 (O.L.R.), 784 (D.L.R.).
179 [1978] 1S.C.R. 753, [1977] 2 W.W.R. 111, 72 D.L.R. (3d) 500.
0

"8 R.S.S. 1965, c. 397.
181See, e.g., supra note 179, at 794 (S.C.R.), 145 (W.W.R.), 528 (D.L.R.) (per

Spence J.), at 808-809 (S.C.R.), 158 (W.W.R.), 539 (D.L.R.) (per Beetz, J.), and the
dissenting opinion of Laskin, C.J.C.
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prejudice the statutory scheme of pari passu distribution among all creditors
of an estate. Moreover, given the apparent inapplicability of the Creditors'
Relief Act, it is not inconceivable for a court to revert to the common law first
come, first served basis of distribution in lieu of any statutory provision
governing the matter.
Voidable Transactions
The concluding chapter in Professor Dunlop's work deals with voidable
transactions, an area of the law superficially easy to grasp, but filled with an
overabundance of conceptual and practical pitfalls and difficulties. The
author takes his readers through the minefields, hedgerows and labyrinths
with some ease, however, beginning with an essential historical overview of
English and Canadian legislation.
L.

In discussing early English fraudulent conveyance legislation, Dunlop
notes a "permissive attitude towards preferential treatment [that] might well
be proper in a legal system in which individual creditors ranked in order of
delivery of their writs to the sheriff ....,,182 While Professor Dunlop is correct
in concluding that the absence of fraudulent preference legislation is less
justifiable where a paripassudistribution regime exists - for example, under
the present creditors' relief legislation - it is not clear why this absence may
be "proper" in a regime in which creditors rank in order of delivery of their
writs to the sheriff. A fraudulent preference given by a debtor may, of course,
upset any distribution regime - where, for example, the preferred creditor
ranks below another creditor who would be the lawful recipient of proceeds
realized from a sale of the debtor's exigible assets.
A "sleeper" in respect of fraudulent conveyance - as opposed to
fraudulent preference - legislation is sub-section 4(1) of the Assignments and
Preferences Act. 18 3 This provision is usually passed over unnoticed or with
little comment, perhaps because it appears in a statute dealing essentially with
fraudulent preferences (transactions between a debtor and one of his
creditors). Dunlop accords it only two sentences, the first one descriptive and
the second one concluding that "[t]he provision is nothing more than a limited
version of the Statute of Elizabeth [1571, 13 Eliz. 1, c. 5] the precursor of
statutes and would appear to add little to the
modern fraudulent conveyance
84
English legislation." 1
It is unfortunate that the author chooses to mention sub-section 4(1) in
the context of fraudulent preference legislation, and then only en passantand
far too cryptically. Sub-section 4(1) expressly requires an impeaching creditor
to prove, inter alia, that the impugned transaction was "made by a person at a
time when he is in insolvent circumstances or is unable to pay his debts in full,
or knows that he is on the eve of insolvency." 185 Under, for example, the Ontario FraudulentConveyances Act, 186 however, there is no express requirement
182Dunlop

at 510.

183
R.S.O. 1980, c. 33.
184
Dunlop at 534.
185
See Carmody v. Amorde andRobertson (1930), 38 O.W.N. 62 (C.A.).
186 R.S.O. 1980, c. 176.
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to prove insolvency or knowledge of impending insolvency (although, as a
practical matter, such a state of affairs goes some considerable distance in
proving the debtor's fraudulent intent or in establishing suspicious circumstances smacking of such an intent).
In addition, it is important to bear in mind that the saving provisions in
sub-section 4(1) are different from those in the Fraudulent Conveyances
Act. 187 Put briefly, the voiding provisions of the latter statute do not apply
where the conveyance is for good consideration and bonafide to a person who
has no notice or knowledge of the debtor's intent. 188 The saving provisions in
respect of sub-section 4(1) are, however, more complicated. Sub-section 4(1)
must be read "[s]ubject to section 5," which provides a list of excluded transactions (some of which are clearly not referable to fraudulent conveyances as
such, but relate to fraudulent preferences under sub-section 4(2) ). For example, sub-section 5(1) provides, interalia, that:
[N]othing in section 4 applies.., to any bonafide sale... made in the ordinary
course of trade or calling to an innocent purchaser or person,... nor to any bona
fide conveyance, assignment, transfer or delivery over any goods or property of
any kind, that is made in consideration of a present actual bonafide payment in
money, or by way of security for a present actual bonafide advance of money, or
that is made in consideration of a present actual bonafide sale or delivery of goods
or other property where ... the goods or other property sold or delivered bear a
fair and reasonable relative value to the consideration therefor.
Accordingly, under section 3 of the FraudulentConveyance Act, the consideration necessary to save a transaction need only be "good". Full, or even
adequate, consideration is not essential, 189 although nominal or grossly inadequate consideration will not do. 190 It may even include "natural love and affection", although this is not at all clear. 191 By way of contrast, the consideration necessary to save a transaction under sub-section 5(1) of the Assignments
and PreferencesAct must be "fair and reasonable". It is therefore easier to
impeach a transaction under the latter Act than it is under the FraudulentConveyances Act, at least insofar as the consideration requirement is concerned.
This state of affairs is illustrated by the case of Leighton v. Muir,192 where the
creditor could not succeed under the Statute of Elizabeth (applicable in Nova
Scotia), but could successfully impeach the transaction for want of "fair and
reasonable" consideration under the Assignments and PreferencesAct. 193
187 R.S.O. 1980, c. 176.
188R.S.O.

1980, c. 176, s. 3. See also s. 4.
e.g., Leighton v. Muir (1962), 34 D.L.R. (2d) 332 (N.S.S.C.); Owen Sound
General and Marine Hospitalv. Mann, [1953] O.R. 643, [1953] 3 D.L.R. 417 (H.C.);
and Buckland v. Rose (1859), 7 Gr. 440 at 448.
190See, e.g., Fleming v. Edwards (1896), 23 O.A.R. 718 at 722 (per Armour C.J.)
(S.C.), rev'd on othergrounds (1896), 23 O.A.R. 722 (S.C. App. Div.); Hickerson v.
Parrington(1891), 18 O.A.R. 635 at 643 (S.C. App. Div.); and Meeker CedarProducts
Ltd. v. Edge (1968), 12 C.B.R. (N.S.) 49, 68 D.L.R. (2d) 294 (B.C.C.A.), aff'd (1968),
12 C.B.R. (N.S.) 60, 1 D.L.R. (3d) 240n. (S.C.C.).
191
See Mowbray, ed., Lewin on Trusts (16th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1964)
at 112; Cromwell v. Comeau (1957), 39 M.P.R. 347, 8 D.L.R. (2d) 676 (N.S.S.C.), per
Doull, J. (dissenting); and Langstaff, The Cheat'sCharter?(1975), 91 L.Q. Rev. 86.
192Supra note 189.
193 R.S.N.S. 1954, c. 17.
189See,
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A final point respecting fraudulent preferences concerns the distinction in
Canadian legislation between preferences that occur within sixty days before
they are impeached and preferences that occur outside the sixty day period.
Sub-section 4(3) of the Ontario Assignment and PreferencesAct' 94 provides as
follows:
Subject to section 5, if such a transaction with or for a creditor has the effect of
giving that creditor a preference over the other creditors of the debtor or over any
one or more of them, it shall, in and with respect to any action or proceeding that,
within sxity days thereafter, is brought, had or taken to impeach or set aside such
transaction, be presumedprimafacie to have been made with the intent mentioned
in subsection (2), and to be an unjust preference within the meaning this Act
whether it be made voluntarily or under pressure.
While Professor Dunlop adequately discusses the apparent nature and scope
of the legislation, some recent case lav has tended to blur the line between actions within and actions outside the sixty day period. In Avco FinancialServices Canada Ltd. v. West,195 Cooper J.A. stated with respect to an action
commenced outside the sixty day period:
I address myself first to the burden of proof which rested upon Avco as the
plaintiff in the action. I respectfully adopt what was said by Chief Justice Cowan
of the Trial Division of this Court in Royal Bank of Canadav. Kirkpatrick et al.
(1977), 20 N.S.R. (2d) 458 at p. 468:
With regard to the burden of proof that the transfer of the property in question was made with intent to defeat, hinder, delay or prejudice the plaintiff
creditor, it is clear that, if the effect of the transfer might be expected to be, and
has, in fact, been to defeat, hinder, delay, or prejudice the creditor, the Court
will attribute the fraudulent intention to the settlor .... 196
A similar view was expressed in Wilson Equipment Ltd. v. Union Construction Ltd. 197 - a view that seems to adopt the analogous views of Lord
Hatherley L.C. in the famous fraudulent conveyance case of Freeman v.
Pope,198 rather than the contrary views of Lord Esher M.R. in Re Wise; Ex
parte Mercer'99 (a longstanding conflict discussed by Dunlop at some
length 200).
As indicated earlier, under the Assignments and Preferences Act, the
debtor ordinarily must be insolvent. Therefore, every payment to one of his
creditors will necessarily have the effect of prejudicing the other creditors.
Having regard to this fact, and if the cases noted above accurately represent
the law - in respect of which no categorial opinion ought reasonably to be
ventured - there would seem to be little practical difference between the
burden of proof where sub-section 4(3) applies and where it does not apply.

194 R.S.O.

1980, c. 33.
195
(1979),
101
D.L.R. (3d) 82 (N.S.C.A.).
1961d. at 84-85.
197 (1979), 31 C.B.R. (N.S.) 208 (N.S.S.C.).
198 (1870), 5 Ch. App. 538.
199 (1886), 17 Q.B.D. 290 (C.A.).
200 Dunlop at 514-20.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Creditor-DebtorLaw in Canada is indeed an admirable and timely book.
It deserves to be read and reread, and will assuredly attain the status of a
seminally important work in Canadian jurisprudence. Its major drawback notwithstanding the legitimate view that the whole field cannot possibly be
covered - is its virtual neglect of any consideration of the relationship between enforcement law and family law.
The enactment of new family law statutes in Canada heralded the introduction of entirely novel property law regimes for spouses. Given the
generally comprehensive nature of family law reform, it is surprising that most
statutes ignore the rights of creditors. 20' For example, sub-section 4(1) of the
Ontario Family Law Reform Act 20 2 gives each spouse a right to have "family
assets divided in equal shares" if any one of three statutory conditions is
satisfied. Is the "right" to an equal division of family assets, including the
matrimonial home, subject to seizure and sale under a writ of execution? In
the case of a matrimonial home, can a creditor of the non-titled spouse file a
writ of execution that would bind the property and prevent its disposition by
the titled spouse? Can an order for the division of family assets defeat the
rights of the titled spouse's creditors? Can the rights of the titled spouse's
creditors be interfered with by an order for exclusive possession under section
45 in favour of the non-titled spouse? While the Act is silent, the courts have
gradually come to deal with some of these questions. 20 3 For example, in Re
Maroukis and Maroukis,204 the Ontario Court of Appeal made it clear that,
until the court makes an order dividing family assets, no rights are conferred
by section 4 of the Family Law Reform Act, 20 5 and the rights of the creditors
of the titled spouse are, therefore, unimpaired.
These and other matters relating to family law - even the basic statutory
and regulatory provisions governing enforcement in the family courts - are
of critical importance and ought to have been comprehended by Professor
Dunlop's book, notwithstanding its present size. However, let it not be
thought that this omission detracts from the vast amount of material that is in
fact included. In respect of the latter, readers will surely share the view that the
Canadian legal community owes a very sizeable debt of gratitude to Professor
Dunlop.
By M.A.
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201See, however, The MatrimonialPropertyAct, S.S. 1979, c. M-6. 1, ss. 43-45,
and Court
OrderEnforcement Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 75, s. 88.
202
R.S.O. 1980, c. 152.
203 See also, OLRC Report, Part I at 83-96, and Part III at 53-60.
204(1981), 33 O.R. (2d) 661, 125 D.L.R. (3d) 718, 21 R.P.R. 1 (C.A.).
20 5
R.S.O. 1980, c. 152.
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